A NATIONAL DISGRACE:
The Story of the Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast During WW II,
Based on Contemporary Evidence Not Racial Demagoguery
By
Lee
Allen, Lt.Col. U. S. Army (Ret.)
with
help from
William
J. Hopwood, Cmdr. U.S.N.R. (Ret.)
-----
This
piece has several purposes. First, it presents an accounting of the
evacuation of the Japanese based on contemporary evidence, not on
the basis of racial demagoguery. Second, it provides access to
important, mostly primary source material, that relates to the issue
of the evacuation. This material has previously been ignored,
overlooked, unavailable or assumed to not exist. Access to most
material is by imbedded links in the text that lead directly to the
document referenced. Third, it provides a guide to the chronology of
the event and many details regarding conditions and experiences.
Fourth, it exposes, rebuts, and discredits many of the claims made
by the Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians concerning motives, conditions, achievements, loyalty and
threat posed by certain Japanese and exaggerated or false claims
concerning the service and accomplishments of Japanese Americans
during WW II. Fifth, it assesses the harm done in the United States
by the adoption of the race-based, politically correct version of
this historical event and the government’s support of it.
This
piece is far from comprehensive. But it does cover many of the prime
elements of the event. There is much more to be learned by a study
of other documents in Internmentarchives.com.
I
urge the reader to apply his own logic and understanding of the
world to what he reads and then evaluate the correctness of what is
presented and the wisdom of the evacuation order. While reading the
various documents detailing the threat to the country posed by
Japanese on the West Coast see if you can find any indications,
whatsoever, that race played a role in the assessments.
About
the Author:
Lee
Allen was a graduate of West Point who at one time served as the Intelligence
Plans Officer for Terrorism in the Defense Intelligence Agency. During
WW II he was interned by the Imperial Japanese Army with his mother
and brother in real concentration camps in the Philippines.
-----
A
NATIONAL DISGRACE
The
evacuation
of Japanese and Japanese Americans from the West Coast in the early
days of WW II is one of the most misrepresented events in American
history. This did not happen by accident. It was the result of a
well-planned and executed effort, paid for largely by the government
and supported by media and others who were only too willing to accept
as true what they were told and use their influence to propagate the
false narrative. Thereby, they denigrated our nation and the efforts
of our wartime leaders to protect us from an aggressive and
treacherous Japanese enemy.
THE
COMMISSION
The
chronology
of this misrepresentation helps tell the tale. During the
administration of Jimmy Carter, on July 31, 1980,with a congress
controlled by the Democrats, a nine-member Commission was formed to
investigate the circumstances surrounding the evacuation. Called the
Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Evacuation of Civilians (CWRIC) it was bi-partisan in that it included Democrats and
Republicans but it was biased in that most of those appointed to it
were of a mind that a great injustice had been done and should be
redressed.
The
Commission
was directed to:
1. Review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive
Order Numbered 9066, issued February 19, 1942, and the impact of such
Executive Order on American citizens and permanent resident aliens;
2. Review directives of United States military forces requiring
the relocation and , in some cases, detention in internment camps of
American citizens, including Aleut civilians, and permanent resident
aliens of the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands; and
3. Recommend appropriate remedies
Before
the
Commission had commenced its work four of its members, among them
former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, and Father Robert Drinan,
a former congressman and well-known Catholic civil rights activist,
had publicly gone on record with remarks strongly condemning the
governments’ evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast during WWII. Father Drinan went so far as having asked in
advance of any investigation being started, “How much are we going to
give them?” [Lowman,
MAGIC, p. 72]
Over
a
period of two years the Commission visited 20 cities and took
testimony from about 750 individuals and supposedly conducted
extensive research on the subject, including “An extensive effort … to
locate and to review the records of government action and to analyze
other sources of information including contemporary writings, personal
accounts and historical analysis.”
This
claim
of “extensive” effort,
though largely skewed to arriving at a predetermined position on the
subject being investigated, was used to add credibility to its final
report, Personal Justice Denied,
[hereafter PJD] which was
published in 1982. The Commission made almost no effort to reveal the
threat our country faced from Japan and from those of Japanese
ancestry living on the West Coast. Nor did it fully document the
disloyalty of Japanese Americans before and after the evacuation or
accurately depict events and conditions in Relocation Centers. The few
individuals who presented evidence in support of wartime government
actions were largely ignored, often ridiculed in public and given no
credence in the Commission’s final report. [426: 13]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=426&pagenum=13
See
the
following letter from John J. McCloy,
Roosevelt’s Assistant Secretary of War, describing the work and
investigative malpractice associated with the Commission. He called
its conduct “an horrendous affront to our tradition for fair and
objective hearings.” He tells how his testimony and that of others
testifying in support of the government action “was met with hisses and boos,” among other things. [426;
13-14]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=426&pagenum=13
No
Military Justification for the Evacuation
The
Commission
determined that there was no military justification for the evacuation
and that it was largely caused by racism (not clearly defined), war
hysteria (not demonstrated among leaders) and a lack of political will
on the part of national leaders. [PJD 18] This despite the fact that our WW II national leaders were
demonstrating the utmost in political will in preparing to fight the
war. It further concluded that there was not a single case of “active
disloyalty” [PJD 28]
(whatever that means) by anyone of Japanese ancestry during the war.
This
last
claim, which has been picked up and repeated endlessly since the
report’s publication is a perfect example not only of the bias of the
report but of its shoddy scholarship and intention to deceive.
Niihau
While
the
fires of the Pearl Harbor attack were still burning a Japanese
American named Harada on the small Hawaiian Island of Niihau assisted
a Japanese pilot, who had crashed his damaged plane, to take over the
island using weapons from the plane. Harada later committed suicide.
It wasn’t as if the Commission didn’t know about the incident, because
it is described in some detail in footnote 14 on pages 430-431 of the
Commission’s report, PJD. It was only mentioned in the body of the
report as “The Niihau Incident,” not as disloyalty or treason. Office
of Naval Intelligence report on the incident at: [425; 68]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=135790&pagenum=68
Ignorance
of Magic
In
the
process of its deliberations the Commission failed to consult the
large array of intelligence reports from various agencies that
described the threat posed by some Japanese on the West Coast.
Most
importantly
it was ignorant of the existence of high-level Japanese diplomatic
messages intercepted and decrypted prior to the Pearl Harbor attack
that revealed widespread espionage networks along the West Coast being
run by individuals of Japanese ancestry, including U.S. citizens.
This
information
had been very closely held during the war. Only a handful of top
leaders were privy to it in its pure form, with knowledge of where it
came from and how it was obtained. Magic was declassified in 1977 making it publicly available,
but overlooked, during the Commission’s deliberations.
Some
of
this Magic intelligence was even published in the popular press during
the time of the Commission’s investigation. “… evidence that these
Magic diplomatic intercepts gave of Terasaki’s extensive network of informants among ‘our second generation workers
in airplane plants.’” [John Costello, The Pacific War 1941- 1945,
1981, p.613] Magic will be discussed in detail shortly.
When
the
substance of the intercepted messages was made public in a New York
Times Op Ed by David D. Lowman shortly after the Commission concluded
its “investigation” an addendum to its report [427; 12]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=427&pagenum=12
was
added
that, among other things, claimed the Japanese reports of espionage
organizations on the West Coast were “puffery” on the part of those
reporting.
The
addendum
also claimed, in a most lawyerly way:
Much has been made of the sentence
in Personal Justice Denied which
states that ‘not a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or
fifth column activity was committed by an American citizen of
Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese alien on the West
Coast.’ This statement stands. The Magic cables do not identify
individuals in those groups who committed demonstrable acts of
espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity.[427; 16]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00427&search_id=&pagenum=16
This
was
precisely the reverse of the argument made by the U.S. Government and
recognized by the Supreme Court in 1943: that even though it was known
that such activity was ongoing, it was not known exactly who was doing
it. Therefore, the evacuation of all Japanese was necessary. The
Commission seemed to think that if individuals could not be identified
it meant that none of the activities were taking place. A bit stupid.
The
addendum
also argues that since setting up an intelligence gathering
organization in the U.S. before the war, which was organized to
operate in the event of war, was not illegal at the time it was done,
it should not be considered a legitimate reason for assuming a threat
existed after Pearl Harbor. Even though such gathering was being
actively used to obtain information on our military services. This
sort of sophistry is endemic to the Commission’s entire report.
The
Commission’s News Coverage
The
Commission’s
hearings received widespread publicity in the press. For the two years
it deliberated, a multitude of stories describing various hardships,
perceived insults, unfair treatment, property loss and bleak detention
were chronicled in the press and spread throughout the nation and
world by news agencies.
Coupled
with
this were heroic stories of Japanese service during the war, many
exaggerated and some fabricated, which were told to demonstrate, by
contrast with the terrible government treatment given evacuees, the
extent that these loyal and valiant people had been mistreated for no
reason. [See “Critique of the Smithsonian Exhibition” for examples of
fabrication and exaggeration.]
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/smithsonian/smithsonian1.php
These
examples
of fabrication and exaggeration will be covered in some detail later.
Dearth
of Contemporary Intelligence Reports
Contemporary
intelligence
reports were not discovered, examined and publicized by the Commission
even though it possessed government authority and resources to seek
such documents. This was most likely because a review of intelligence
available early in the war would not comport with the flawed,
melodramatic recounting of motives and actions the Commission
determined led to the evacuation.
It
was
impossible for individuals, who suspected the existence of such
reports and what they might reveal to obtain them in a timely manner
and present them to the Commission. Lack of official status to gain
quick access and the requirement to seek the information through the
ponderous and time-consuming Freedom of Information Act or archival
research was prohibitive. One such request to the FBI by the author
took years to obtain.
David
D.
Lowman, a former Special Assistant to the Director of the National
Security Agency, who had written the NYT op-ed revealing the Magic
Intelligence, mentioned above, who, when later acting as a consultant
to the U.S. Government on various court cases and had access to
various archives, gathered a trove of reports from different agencies
that were later published in Magic, Athena Press, Provo, Utah 2001.
Those reports and others, gathered by the author and his sons, from
different archives are referred to in this review.
The
Commission’s Use of Intelligence
Personal
Justice Denied contains a ten-page section on Intelligence. [PJD 51- 60; 427:1- 11]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=427&pagenum=1
It
purports
to present a survey of what was known at the time E.O 9066 was signed;
thus, why there was no military threat to justify the action.
Munson
The
first
three pages relate to the efforts of a newspaper stringer named Munson
who talked to a lot of people in the Japanese community and concluded
there was little threat and what there was could be easily handled.
Munson and his estimates of the Japanese threat were well known before
the Pearl Harbor attack as they were published in newspapers.
It
takes
a special kind of naivety to imagine that a stranger talking with
individuals who may have knowledge of a secret plan to gather
intelligence or wage war on the country would be given that
information PJD declared:
Although Munson was an amateur at
intelligence, he talked at length to professionals such as the FBI
agent in charge in Honolulu and the people in Naval Intelligence in
southern California. He was also in touch with British Intelligence
in California and reported that they shared his principal views. [PJD 53]
This
statement
is in itself a vivid declaration of the Commission’s own amateur
status. It presumes, among other things, that classified information
would be freely shared with a nosey civilian and that national policy
should be based on the opinions of an amateur because he “reported
that they shared his principal views.”
There
is
no record that Munson ever spoke with anyone with access to Magic
information and even if he had he would surely not have been told
anything.
While
the
Commission relied on Munson for conformation of its conclusion that
there was little military threat to the U. S. from Japanese Americans,
it made no mention that a couple days after Pearl Harbor Munson was
telling the FBI in Los Angeles that it was taking care of only half
the security problem by rounding up Japanese citizens. The other half
of the problem, Munson claimed, was U.S. Citizens of Japanese
ancestry. [15: 42- 45]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=15&pagenum=42
The
remainder
of the PJD Intelligence
section discusses selected portions of a junior naval officer’s (Lt. Cmdr. K.D. Ringle) estimate
of the sociological situation of Japanese on the West Coast before the
war, and selected quotes from other authority references who were
assumed to be knowledgeable and revealing everything they and the
government knew.
Particular
focus
is given to the attack on Pearl Harbor and concludes that the eventual
evacuation from the West Coast was based largely on what proved to be
mistaken claims about sabotage and espionage related to that attack.
Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, is the object of particular
criticism.
Secretary
of the Navy Knox
What
Knox
said about the attack hardly reflected all he knew or what was
available to the government concerning Japanese espionage on the West
Coast. Of course, while Pearl Harbor undoubtedly had a profound
influence on the decision to evacuate the West Coast, insofar as it
demonstrated Japanese military capabilities and U.S. vulnerabilities,
what was actually happening on the West Coast was also important and
largely unknown or ignored by the Commission.
In
this
regard, an ONI memo to the Chief of Naval Operations, entitled
“Japanese Espionage Organization in the United States,” dated February
12, 1941, ten months before the Pearl Harbor attack, recommended the
information be sent to the Secretary of the Navy and the President.
What followed was pretty much a sanitized version of the Magic
intercept #44, received less than two weeks before outlining the
Japanese plan to establish an intelligence organization suitable for
wartime operation. [425; 3]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=3
[416;
6]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00416&search_id=136162&pagenum=6
Neither
Knox
or anyone else privy to this information was free to reveal it.
Lt.
Cmdr. Ringle
The
Commission’s
discussion of Lt. Cmdr. Ringle and his
report of January 26, 1942 ties Munson to Ringle and selectively quotes and misquotes Ringle’s report in an effort to minimize the apparent threat.
PJD says Ringle claimed “There were both
citizens and aliens who could act as saboteurs or espionage agents, but he estimated the
number to be 3% of the total – or 3,500 in the entire United States
who were identifiable individually.” [PJD 54]
Recall
that
in the Magic Addendum the Commission’s General Counsel stated “not a
single documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity
was committed by an American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a
resident Japanese alien on the West Coast.” Apparently, when one of
your chief sources, Ringle, says there
are 3,500 “who would act as saboteurs or
agents” [note the difference between the use of the words “could” in PJD and “would” in Ringle’s report] you can ignore the threat to the country. [425; 72]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=425&pagenum=72
Nor
does Ringle’s report mention “identifiable
individually.” It talks about individuals in custodial detention
(enemy aliens on FBI lists) and members of Japanese organizations
whose membership was “fairly well known.” [425; 72, (c) (d)]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=425&pagenum=72
What
sort
of magical thinking would allow anyone to even intimate that the U.S.
could precisely separate by name 3,500 disloyal individuals from a
group of 120,000? Perhaps that’s why Ringle usually speaks in terms of rough percentages and various levels of
loyalty.
PJD fails to mention that Ringle says when
speaking about Japanese citizens:
… the large majority are at least
passively loyal to the United States. That is, they would knowingly
do nothing whatever to the injury of the United States, but at the
same time would not do anything to the injury of Japan…. most of the
remainder would not engage in active sabotage or insurrection, but
might well do surreptitious observation work for Japanese interests
if given a convenient opportunity. [425; 72, (b)]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=425&pagenum=72
That
sort
of activity was exactly what was revealed in the Magic intercepts.
We have already established
contacts with absolutely reliable Japanese in the San Pedro and San
Diego area, who will keep a close watch on all shipments of
airplanes and other war materials and report the amounts and
destinations of such shipments. [416; 7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=416&pagenum=7
There
is
no knowing what portion of the alien population Ringle places in the minority group remaining after subtracting the “large
majority,” mentioned above, but his vague estimations are clearly a
guess. For argument’s sake let’s say it was 20 percent of the total.
That would be another 7,200 individuals, unknown by name, who would
“do surreptitious observation work for Japanese interests if given a
convenient opportunity.”
PJD also fails to mention Ringle’s assessment
“that seventy-five per cent or more of the Nisei [American born
citizens] are loyal United States citizens.” Simple arithmetic leads
to the conclusion that 25 percent or less were not loyal to the U.S.
In absolute numbers that comprises several thousand, at least. Later
on we will see that this estimate was probably accurate.
Ringle’s estimate of the Japanese threat, such
as it was revealed in PJD,
was given credence in the Commission’s report in part based on Ringle’s claim that “Naval Intelligence sympathized with his opinions.” [PJD 54] [PJD 54, footnote 24 is cited for this claim. It refers to a personal
letter written by Ringle in 1951, 9 years
after the fact.] No such claim is made in the report.
Lt.
Cmdr.
K.D. Ringle, specifically states on page
1 of his report that “The following opinions, amplified in succeeding
paragraphs, are held by the writer:” [425; 71]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=425&pagenum=71
And
the
cover letter from the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to other
agencies transmitting Ringle’s report
specifically states “ … it does not represent the final and official
opinion of the Office of Naval Intelligence on this subject….” [425;
70]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=70
PJD doesn’t mention that Lt. Cmdr. Ringle,
who had a rather benign impression of the Japanese, was restricted
from access to information concerning intercepted Japanese messages
and was clearly unaware of the extensive intelligence operations
revealed in those messages that were on going in the Naval District in
which he served an intelligence officer. [416:7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=416&pagenum=7
The
Ennis Memo
Ringle’s January 26, 1942 report [425; 71]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=135792&pagenum=71
was
well
known during the war and had been used by Edward Ennis, Director,
Alien Enemy Control Unit, a division of the Justice Department, as a
basis to challenge the evacuation of Japanese in the Hirabayashi case before the Supreme Court in 1943.
Ennis’s
memo
to the Solicitor General [327: 1-4]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=327&pagenum=
which
made
a vague and “informal” claim about Ringle’s report representing the ONI position, was not used at the trial, an
action that later led to the charge that the U.S. Government had
purposely withheld information from the court that would have proven
that the evacuation was not necessary.
This
resulted
in a further charge made in the 1980’s during various court cases, and
swallowed by gullible jurists, that the Government had conspired to
deceive the Supreme Court, which, of course, was a charge totally
contrived.
Note
that
the cover letter distributing Ringle’s report, referred to above, lists the Enemy Alien Control Unit as an
addressee. Ennis’s claim that he first came across Ringle’s views in Harper’s Magazine seems to reveal that he wasn’t reading his
own mail.
One
must
wonder what reasoning, legal or otherwise, would conclude that the
Solicitor General had an obligation to submit the unofficial and
personal opinions of a junior naval officer to the Supreme Court in
opposition to the government position he was defending.
Note
that
the Ennis Memo, in evaluating the threat posed by Japanese, groups
individuals by category not by individual evaluation. This was most
likely done because of Ringle’s influence. [327; 2]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=327&pagenum=2
Ennis
cites
unidentified naval officers, and contends that only 10,000 individuals
needed to be evacuated. He admits that “they [the naval officers] did
not make this view known” at the time of the evacuation.
Monday
morning
quarterbacking, kibitzing and second-guessing decisions made by others
are a human pastimes apparently not reserved for civilians alone.
Ennis
on
page 2 [327; 2]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=327&pagenum=2
of
his
memo derives his 10,000 from three groups of Japanese: Kibei,
U. S. citizens who had been educated in Japan; The parents of Kibei and members of pro-Japanese societies.
It
is
certainly not clear that those “absolutely reliable Japanese,”
mentioned in the Magic messages, who were gathering information for
Imperial Japan, were members of one of those groups specified by Ringle and Innes. Those reported as spying in the Army and in aircraft
plants, clearly, were not. But they were certainly part of the
Japanese Imperial intelligence organization in the U.S. whether they
were known by name or not.
This,
of
course, strikes to the heart of the problem: who was and who wasn’t
loyal to the United States. Faced with the reality of on-going
espionage activity by unknown individuals along the West Coast and the
presence of up to 10,000 (Ennis’ estimate based on Ringle’s report) and likely more who were either outright supporters of Japan
or would “do surreptitious observation work for Japanese interests if
given a convenient opportunity,” the question was, what to do.
Evacuation
of
these groups alone would not have eliminated all disloyal Japanese
from the West Coast.
Ennis
also
states:
Thus, in one of the crucial points
of the case [before the Supreme Court] the Government is forced to
argue that individual, selective evacuation would have been
impractical and insufficient when we have positive knowledge that
the only Intelligence agency responsible for advising Gen. DeWitt
gave him advice directly to the contrary.
Where
he
got the idea that ONI was the only agency responsible for advising
Gen. DeWitt or that Lt. Cmdr. Ringle’s personal opinions, which were not the official views of ONI, should
somehow override other more precise information is any one’s guess.
No
Single Statement from ONI on its Position
PJD in the same sentence claiming official sympathy for Ringle’s report said “there is no single statement of their [ONI’s] position.”
Had they checked they might have found, among at least several others,
a 26-page report prepared by the Counter Subversion Section, Office of
Naval Intelligence, dated December 4, 1941, which gives a detailed,
but “admittedly incomplete,” summary of ‘Japanese Intelligence and
Propaganda in the United States During 1941.’ [425; 5]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=425&pagenum=5
PJD takes the legalistic and absurd position that having worked in the
enemy’s intelligence apparatus before war was officially declared may
not have been technically illegal, therefore, such work should not be
considered when assessing the existing threat to the nation after such
declaration was made.
The
Supreme Court
PJD doesn’t point out while describing exculpating claims regarding
Japanese treachery, that what we knew about the Japanese threat at the
beginning of the war would have been classified and that release of
such material at the time would have posed a threat to our war
efforts.
In
the
event this decision to withhold sensitive information, of course,
proved a wise government policy. Magic intercepts proved invaluable
during the war in both theaters of operations.
The
Supreme
Court seemed to recognize this wartime necessity and reality in the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases when it deferred
judgment to the military during emergencies.
The
Supreme
Court said in both cases:
… we cannot reject as unfounded the
judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were
disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could
not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the
war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for
believing that, in a critical hour, such persons could not readily
be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to
the nation’s defense and safety which demanded prompt and adequate
measures be taken to guard against it. [Korematsu]
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/323/214#writing-USSC_CR_0323_0214_ZO
The
Conclusion
The
implication
of so little intelligence in the Intelligence section of PJD,
after such supposedly great effort by the Commission to determine the
truth of the event, was that there was nothing else to know; That
information regarding the threat that led to the evacuation was
non-existent, or flawed if not contrived; That the trust the Supreme
Court placed in Congress and the military was misplaced. This neatly
played into the preconceived conclusion that there was no military
justification for the evacuation.
Absent
the
availability of contemporary intelligence reports on the Japanese
threat and finding “that no military necessity supported the
exclusion” [of Japanese from the West Coast] the Commission cobbled
together its analysis of “Conditions Which Permitted the Decision.” [PJD 8-9] Largely this was a fanciful rendition of what coulda, woulda, shoulda been done but wasn’t, based on the Commission’s flawed assumptions of
the situation at the time.
Absent
any
military necessity, other reasons for the evacuation had to be
identified. Voila! Racism! Hysteria, and lack of political will.
The
Origin of Racism Charge
This
was
a theory that had much earlier been hypothesized in a book published
by the War Relocation Authority the organization that ran the
relocation program.
Titled Wartime Exile, The Exclusion of
the Japanese Americans From the West Coast, it was written by
Ruth E. McKee, a novelist hired by the organization as an historian to
write on the origins of the evacuation. It included breathless
headings such as “THE RALLYING OF THE RAICSTS,” chapter II; “FIRST
ROUND TO THE RACISTS,” chapter III and “TRIUMPH FOR THE RACISTS,” Part
III. [174; 2-3]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=174&pagenum=2
McKee’s
work
was long on speculation, short on pertinent facts, almost devoid of
intelligence regarding the threat, filled with drama, colored by her
personal sympathies and dismissive of any threat. In short it was a
precursor to the Commission’s report, PJD.
See her “References Quoted” for Wartime Exiles to get an idea of her
sources of information. Aside from General DeWitt’s Final Report most
are from newspapers, editorials and sociologic studies. None directly
deal with the threat. [174; 163]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00174&search_id=&pagenum=163
Bernard
Lewis
the famous historian observed about the writing of history, “the
historian is limited by the evidence at his disposal.” In the case of
the history of the Japanese evacuation, in Exile and PJD, the evidence at
the disposal of the historical writer is seriously limited, sometimes
purposely, and what is used supports the preferred story line. McKee
as an “historian” didn’t know what she didn’t know and didn’t seem too
interested in finding out.
The
Villain
In Exile and PJD the nexus of the dark motivation of racism is Lieutenant General
John L. DeWitt, Commander of the Western Defense Command. With all the
subtlety of a TV script and abject ignorance of the army and
government’s decision making process during WW II, Gen. DeWitt was
made the villain and fall-guy for the evacuation and the focus of
hatred for those needing such an object.
It
is
puerile to contend, as both McKee and the Commission did, that, faced
with the destruction of much of the Pacific Fleet, threatened with
further attacks against Hawaii, the West Coast and Panama Canal, the
President and high command of the country would rely on and support a
recommendation to evacuate the Japanese population from the West Coast
without convincing evidence of its necessity. Yet that was the story
that was contrived, proffered, swallowed and propagated throughout the
land by the media, academia, and many others involved in such things.
The term Big Lie comes to mind.
It
seems
to me that any thinking person would ask why, when caught unprepared
by a surprise attack, one of the country’s first actions would be a
costly racist action without justification. The answer seems simple.
It wouldn’t.
DeWitt’s
label
as a racist in part derived from a newspaper headline quoting him as
saying “A Jap is a Jap.” In fact his statement during a press
interview was much more refined and detailed. The headline was
contrived to encapsulate the general thrust of his comments.
DeWitt’s
comments
on the Japanese situation were essentially the same as those being
taught in the Japanese Language School attended by future senator
Daniel Inouye in Hawaii as recorded in his memoir and most likely in
other such schools.
You must remember that only a trick
of fate has brought you so far from your homeland, but there must be
no question of your loyalty. When Japan calls, you must know that it
is Japanese blood that flows in your veins.
This,
also,
could be fairly summarized as, “A Jap is a Jap.” [Daniel K. Inouye
with Lawrence Elliott, Journey to Washington (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1967) p 36-37.]
The
Commission
not only labeled DeWitt a racist it ascribed racism as the motivation
for his recommendations for the evacuation. [PJD 8-9]
Exile had also labeled DeWitt a racist and laid the blame for the evacuation
on him. Quoting Professor Eugene V. Rostow of Yale who had been in the State Department during the war and who
claimed that the racists
‘were lucky in their general, for
General DeWitt amply proved himself to be one of them in opinion and
values. As events happened, he became the chief policy maker in the
situation’ and achieved a new high in ‘American military
officiousness.’ [174; 152-153]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00174&search_id=&pagenum=152
McKee
claimed
that Rostow’s conclusion about DeWitt, in
1945, came at a time when “factual knowledge had replaced the
misinformation and legends about the group that had been evacuated.”
She then cites the Nisei who had served so well during the war and
says those evacuated were “unknown and therefore easily
misrepresented.” This was to become a familiar, and logically flawed,
theme in the following decades: some were exemplary in their service;
therefore, all must have been good, loyal people. Nor was it true that
by 1945 “factual knowledge had replaced the misinformation.” [174;
153]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00174&search_id=&pagenum=153
McKee
just
thought there was nothing more to learn about the situation. The
Commission should have known better but ignored what there was to
know.
Rostow was a lawyer.
The
Flawed Chronology
McKee, Rostow and the Commission laid the blame
on Gen. DeWitt based on a flawed chronology of events that they
accepted a priori: to wit, that DeWitt made the recommendation to
evacuate all Japanese; that President Roosevelt approved that
recommendation without proper justification and that E.O 9066 was then
promulgated and the evacuation began.
The
actual
chronology is clearly documented in Guarding
the
United States and its Outposts by Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman and Byron Fairchild, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964. [109; 19]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=109&pagenum=19
According
to
Secretary of War Stimson’s diary cited in the above reference, the
President made his decision on February 11, 1942. “Stimson after
describing the situation to the President ‘fortunately found that he
was very vigorous about it and [he] told me to go ahead on the line
that I myself thought the best.’
What Mr. Stimson thought best at this
time, according to his Diary, was to begin as quickly as possible
with the evacuation of both citizen and alien Japanese from the
vicinity of ‘the most vital places of army and navy production.’
[109; 19]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=109&pagenum=19
DeWitt’s
recommendation
to evacuate all Japanese, alien and U.S. citizen, which was made on
February 13th and received at GHQ in Washington D.C. on the 18th, was
made by direction from above and only after the President had given
the authority for such action, and that action decided on. Before this
final recommendation, which included evacuation of American-born
Japanese, DeWitt had never recommended evacuation of any persons other
than alien enemies. [109; 19]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=109&pagenum=19
“Alien
enemy”
was a classification given to citizens of countries at war with the
U.S. who were 14 or older. They were stripped of all their protections
under the constitution and subject, at the President’s direction, to
confiscation of property and incarceration without due process. See
discussion of Presidential Proclamation 2525 below.
Prior
to
those final recommendations, “If all of General DeWitt’s
recommendations … had been accepted, it would have made necessary the
evacuation of nearly 89,000 enemy aliens … only 25,000 of whom would
have been Japanese,” and none of them U.S. citizens. [109; 17]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=109&pagenum=17
It
is
a revealing insight into the decision making process regarding the
evacuation that DeWitt’s recommendation for the evacuation of all
Japanese
… reached GHQ [in Washington, DC]
at 5pm., 18 February. On 19 February it was decided at a GHQ staff
conference not to concur [to disagree and not support evacuation
U.S. citizens] in General DeWitt’s recommendations, and instead to
recommend to General Clark that only enemy alien leaders be arrested
and interned. [109; 20]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00109&search_id=&pagenum=20
Clark
realizing
the decision had already been made forwarded DeWitt’s directed
recommendation without change “in view of the proposed action already
decided upon by the War Department.”
A
reading by the Commission of this official history of the event would
have been enlightening but it would also have deprived it of the
melodramatic, simplistic version of events and the villain it had
concocted to support its conclusions.
Blaming
the Secretaries
The
Commission’s
charge that Secretary of War Stimson and Assistant Secretary McCloy “failed to insist on a clear military justification for the measures
General DeWitt wished (sic) to undertake” [PJD 9] is absurd.
Again,
DeWitt’s
recommendations were based on information received concerning the
President’s decision to authorize evacuation of all Japanese and
varied from his previous recommendations only in that they now
included evacuation of America-born Japanese (U.S. citizens). [109;
19]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00109&search_id=&pagenum=19
To
claim
that the President, with whom the evacuation decision resided, and the
secretaries of war were somehow not privy to information on Japanese
subversive activities, Magic and otherwise, based on material ignored
or unknown to the Commission is wishful fiction. All three were among
the handful with access to Magic intercepts, which DeWitt was not, and
had access to all other intelligence on the threat.
It
was
the Commission, and not wartime national leaders, that dealt with
rumor, opinion and biased claims, and not intelligence, when arriving
at its conclusions.
Deceptive
Citizenship Classification
The
Commission
also obfuscated the evacuation decision by its almost total refusal to
deal with the legal status of Japanese citizens, who it
euphemistically called “permanent resident aliens” and grouped into
the classification of “Japanese Americans,” a term usually denoting
American-born (U.S. citizens) of Japanese ancestry. This was a
legalistic dodge based not on the law as it existed but on the law as
they thought it should have been.
On
December
8, 1941 the day after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt
issued Presidential Proclamation 2525, “Alien Enemies –Japanese.”
[Proclamation 2525]
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/smithsonian/smithsonian10.php
The
action
was authorized under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 (which still exists
today as 50 USC sections 21-24) and was the authority that governed
the treatment of nationals of a hostile foreign nation who are within
the United States when a declared war exists between the United States
and their home country. The Act also applies if that foreign nation
subjects a United States territory to invasion. a predatory incursion
or any attempt or threat thereof. The Act specifies that all nationals of said foreign nation
fourteen years or older who are within the United States shall be
liable to arrest, internment, and deportation as alien enemies,
The
Enemy Alien Act
The
Enemy
Alien Act specified that any action to be taken by the U.S. under the
Act had to be first authorized by the President of the United States
by proclamation. This was
done when President Roosevelt issued the proclamation.
The
first
paragraph of the proclamation quoting U.S. law as its authority reads:
‘all natives, citizens, denizens,
or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being of the age of
fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States and
not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended,
restrained, secured and removed as alien enemies. The President is
authorized in any such event, by his proclamation thereof, or other
public act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the
United States, to ward the aliens who become so liable, the manner
and degree of restraint to which they shall be subject and in what
cases and upon what security their residence shall be permitted and
to provide for the removal of those who, not being permitted to
reside within the United States, refuse or neglect to depart
therefrom, and to establish any other regulations which are found
necessary in the premises and for the public safety.’
Paragraph
(5)
under the regulation section of the proclamation restricts the
possession or use of a variety of items including weapons.
The
Commission
excused the very possession of such items by alien enemies stating
“The FBI did confiscate arms and contraband from some ethnic Japanese,
but most were items normally in possession of any law-abiding
civilian…” [PJD 7] It failed
to reveal that its “most” did not include one FBI raid in the Monterey
area of California that “found more than 60,000 rounds of ammunition
and many rifles, shotguns and maps of all kinds,” as reported in Gen.
DeWitt’ Final Report. [8; 26]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=8&pagenum=26
The
Commission
also failed to mention, predictably, was that alien enemies were not
“law-abiding civilian(s).” They
were enemy aliens prohibited such items by Presidential Proclamation
during wartime. Arrogantly disregarding strictures imposed on them
during wartime could easily be interpreted, and probably were, as an
unfriendly act of defiance.
German
and Italian alien enemies
Similar
proclamations
were issued for Germans and Italians. The proclamations were the
authority used by the FBI to round up various alien enemy citizens
considered dangerous. After individual review thousands of Japanese,
German, Italian and a lesser number of other alien enemy citizens were
placed in Department of Justice Detention Camps for the duration of
the war. These people were “interned” for the duration of the war, not
relocated, which connotes a very different situation, resettlement in
interior states.
Family
members
of those in detention camps were allowed to volunteer to join them.
Until early 1945, when an additional 5,620 Japanese Americans who had
renounced their U.S. citizenship were included among those interned in
Dept. of Justice detention centers, there were approximately the same
number German and Japanese alien enemies and family members, about
11,000 each, in detention centers. [102; 1]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=102&pagenum=
The
Commission
and later Congress refers to Japanese citizens (alien enemies)
throughout its report as “permanent resident aliens” and subsumes them
into the category of Japanese-Americans. The desired result, no doubt,
is that whenever the evacuation is referred to it is as affecting
120,000 Japanese Americans.
The
result
of this construct was that approximately 38,000 Japanese citizens,
alien enemies, who were evacuated from the West Coast to Relocation
Centers [2; 117]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=117
(as
differentiated
from Dept. of Justice Detention Centers), under a well established
legal process, were considered by the Commission and therefore by the
media and others to have had all the rights of U.S. citizens. They did
not.
Recent
renditions
of the evacuation routinely include the statement that 70 percent of
those evacuated were U.S. citizens. This is an unexplained sop to the
fact that the remaining 30 percent were not citizens. But it is seldom
if ever noted that alien enemies were not “interned” illegally. In any
case the actual percentage of citizens was 64.8 percent as of 1
January 1943 as opposed to the oft-quoted 70 percent. But 70 percent
is apparently close enough for historical revision work. [2; 117]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=117
Why
The U.S. Citizens?
Knowing
that
of the 110,240 individuals under War Relocation Authority on January
1, 1943, 71,531 were American born it seems reasonable to ask why
these citizens were included in the evacuation.
One
reason
was that some number, unknown individually or by total numbers, was
involved in activities inimical to the U.S. In other words, among the
American born Japanese there were some, probably representing a small
percentage of the total but a large number in absolute terms who were
either engaged in activities dangerous to the country, belonged to
groups sympathetic to Imperial Japan, or harbored loyalty towards that
enemy nation. This possibility will be reviewed and documented at a
later time. Conduct during evacuation will also be discussed as a
clear indication of this element’s disloyalty.
Dual
citizenship
and the implications that status held regarding obligations to Japan,
which will be discussed in some detail later, and the threat from
those U.S. citizens who had been educated in Japan, Kibei,
fall within this category. Recall that Lt. Cmdr. Ringle in his report that was selectively quoted by the Commission had this
to say about the Kibei.
…the most potentially dangerous
element of all are those American citizens of Japanese ancestry who
have spent the formative years of their lives, from 10 to 20, in
Japan and have returned to the United States … These people are
essentially and inherently Japanese and may have been deliberately
sent back to the United States by the Japanese government to act as
agents …. In spite of their legal citizenship and the protection
afforded them by the Bill of Rights, they should be looked upon as
enemy aliens and many of them placed in custodial detention. [425;
73]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=425&pagenum=73
This
evaluation
is from the sympathetic intelligence officer whose selective opinions
are frequently quoted by the Commission.
The
Children
Another
reason
for the evacuation of U.S. citizens was most assuredly the desire to
keep families together. As described in Presidential Proclamation
2525, not even Japanese citizens were subject to the onerous control
of enemy aliens if under the age of 14.
The
Imperial
Japanese Army in the Philippines did not separate children from their
parents when interning them in real concentration camps. One need not
have much of an imagination to contemplate the harm to children and
parents if such a legalistic separation had been insisted upon. It is
well to remember that 60% of the American-born in relocation centers
were minor children. [2; 113]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=113
Remember,
that
in the 1940’s the age of majority was 21.
From
a
practical point of view alone family separation based on citizenship
status would have presented a humanitarian and administrative
nightmare.
The
Germans and Italians Again
Another
issue
made much of by the Commission in support of its charge of racism was
the difference in the way the Japanese population was handled in
contrast to the German and Italian. This specious line of reasoning
resonates with individuals whose understanding of the world is such
that they think everything needs to be, can be or should be fair.
War
is
not an exercise in civil liberties. And certainly no country at war is
expected to or ever has treated threats from enemies equally, nor have
they ever been thought to have an obligation to treat the belligerents
they face in exactly the same way.
As
earlier
mentioned, in regards to “alien enemies” roughly the same number of
Germans as Japanese were interned in Department of Justice Detention
Facilities until late in the war when 5,620 additional Japanese
renounced their U.S. citizenship and were declared alien enemies and
included.
Germany
and
Italy did not conduct a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, destroy a good
part of our Pacific Fleet and leave our county’s West Coast
vulnerable. Nor did we fear they might do it or worse again.
That
the
U.S. evacuated 120,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry from only the
western three states, Washington, Oregon and California and the
southern part of Arizona, when by the Ringle/Ennis
estimate only 10,000 of them were considered a threat, is a fact. The
relationship between the threat and the area of evacuation seems
clear.
No
U.S.
citizens of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from the other states,
except for 219 who petitioned the government to be allowed to reside
in Relocation Centers. [2; 23]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00002&search_id=&pagenum=23
Surely
this
voluntary participation is a first in the worldwide history of
“concentration camps.”
Since
no
Japanese in the United States, living outside the West Coast exclusion
area, were affected by the evacuation order, one must wonder why if
the primary cause of the evacuation was racism these others were not
also included?
The
Inauguration of PJD
PJD, de facto, was presented to the nation as an authoritative version of
the historical event, produced by a “bi-partisan” commission,
established by the government, that had studied the subject
extensively, claimed to be objective and had received widespread
public attention during the process. In short, it became the primary
source of information detailing, supposedly authoritatively, the
accepted version of history.
It
was
filled with one-liners, which used over and over again in all forms of
media led to their acceptance as being true. These included: There was
no military threat or justification for the relocation; it was caused
by “racism, wartime hysteria and lack of political will”; there was
not a single example of disloyalty etc. One fascinating aspect of
almost every article or news report on the subject is that it
invariably includes the same statements, almost without variation, a
trademark of propaganda not rational inquiry or reporting.
Added
to
this were statements of supposed facts that became popular to use and
which tended to make the relocation appear far more onerous than it
was. Included in this group was calling all persons of Japanese
ancestry Japanese-Americans; calling relocation centers “concentration
camps” or worse; claiming all Japanese-Americans were imprisoned for
the duration of the war; that they were persecuted because of how they
looked; claiming those relocated “lost everything;” that evacuees
could only bring with them what they could carry and that they only
had 48 hours notice to leave their homes etc.
In
short,
an historical narrative was developed that was long on simplicity,
short on truth and in the process denigrated our nation, its
institutions and its wartime leaders. At the same time it hid the
threat faced by the nation, exculpated thousands of disloyal Japanese,
minimized the efforts made on behalf of evacuees and created a new
victim class.
It
doesn’t
seem to matter how exalted or sophisticated an individual is regarding
scholarship, the approved narrative controls. As recently as April
25-26, 2015 edition of the Wall Street Journal a book review by Yale
Law Professor, John Fabian Witt, contained the following:
Internal government reports [U.S]
had concluded that first-generation American-born men and women of
Japanese ancestry – the so-called Nisei – were loyal to the U.S. and
posed little threat. Even the Japanese government believed that the
Nisei would be of no use to them, a fact that the U.S. knew thanks
to intercepted diplomatic cables from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy.
The
internal
government reports described were most certainly the Ennis memo and
the Ringle report. Let the reader judge,
based on the foregoing discussion of both, whether the Nisei (and Kibei)
were “loyal to the U.S. and posed little threat.” [327]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00327&search_id=135934
And
one
must suppose that since the Japanese government “believed that the
Nisei would be of no use to them” had assigned them to jobs as spies
in aircraft plants and the army! [416; 7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00416&search_id=135933&pagenum=7
PJD also makes the point “Insofar as the Japanese would rely on the Nisei,
there was no knowledge or evidence of organized or individual Nisei
spying or disruption.” This was another example of Magical ignorance.
[427; 10]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00427&search_id=&pagenum=10
In
passing
it might be worthwhile to remark that because a document is labeled
“internal government report” doesn’t mean it has special significance,
as implied by the professor. Nor is it rational to assume that just
because something is in such a report it is either authoritative or
correct. But it sure sounds good and important and seems to be an
acceptable substitute for scholarship.
Intellectual
Honesty of PJD
As
for
the intellectual honesty and historical accuracy of the report itself,
perhaps the best professional evaluation was made by then Chief
Historian, U. S. Army Center of Military History, Dr. David F. Trask,
who had this to say about it.
This report strikes me as essentially
in the form of a legal brief rather than a history. Historical information in this brief serves a specific
purpose – to present the case against the government in the most
favorable light. Such
an approach means that factual information is selected to serve the
interest of the client. It means also that the facts are ordered and
interpreted so as to provide the best support for the client…. All
is calculated to support the conclusion that the government denied
personal justice to those interned during World War II. Facts and
arguments that might tend to support a contrary conclusion are
either excluded or rejected. [57; 2]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=57&pagenum=2
When
Congress
was considering “accepting” the findings of the Commission, the
Department of Justice warned of the dangers of codifying in law an
“official” version of history, suggesting that history is best left to
“historical and scholarly analysis.” [220; 9]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=220&pagenum=9
The Corum Nobis Cases
Assistant
Attorney
General of the United States, Richard K. Willard, testifying before
Congress had this to say about three court cases seeking the set aside
of Japanese American convictions based on a claim that the
government’s “knowingly suppressed evidence and misrepresented facts
in submissions to the Supreme Court during the 1940’s.”
These
were
the three corum nobis cases which have become so
famous as vehicles for “proving” the lack of military justification
for the evacuation and related security orders. Corum nobis is an order to consider facts
not on the trial record which might have changed the outcome of the
case if known at the time.
In
these
cases the “knowingly suppressed evidence and misrepresented facts”
referred to the Edward Ennis memo to the Solicitor General discussed
previously.
The
Assistant
Attorney General testified:
In response to one of these corum nobis petitions filed by Fred Korematsu in the United States District Court for the Norther (sic) District of California, Attorney General Smith determined that
‘it is time to put behind us this controversy … and instead reaffrirm the inherent right of each person to be treated s an individual.’
Accordingly, the Attorney General decided that ‘it is singularly
appropriate to vacate [Korematsu’s]
conviction for nonviolent civil disobedience,’ as well as to do the
same for other similarly situated individuals who request it. Thus, in each of these cases, the United States, while
disputing petitioner’s allegations, moved to vacate the conviction….
[220; 3-4]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00220&search_id=&pagenum=4
Thus
the
convictions were set aside. The government, though it disputed the
claim of evidence suppression, moved to vacate the convictions. Those
bringing the cases, as one might expect, have since claimed that the
convictions were vacated because they proved and the court hearing the
case determined that the government had, in fact, suppressed evidence.
In fact, they prevailed because the government moved to vacate the
convictions.
Attorney
General
Smith “determined that ‘it is time to put behind us this
controversy…’” Instead, his magnanimous gesture was purposely and
wrongly construed as and claimed to be an admission of government
guilt, which it was not. [220; 5]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00220&search_id=&pagenum=5
The
Media Blitz
Between
the
publication of PJD and 1988
when Congress passed Public Law 100-383, which apologized and
authorized a $20,000 dollar payment to evacuees who were still living,
a major effort was undertaken to spread the distorted view of the
evacuation to every source of information media possible. Movies and
TV shows were produced. Articles were written and published in diverse
papers and magazines by the hundreds if not thousands. All repeated
the erroneous conclusions of the Commission and added their own
simplified version of events, including a grossly exaggerated
accounting of Japanese-American awards and accomplishments in WW II.
The
object
of this effort was to garner grassroots support for the passage of
redress, or money, and an apology for the wartime evacuation.
Educating
the Public
The
passage
of the law ushered in a new phase of the historical revision effort.
Along with the payment to those still alive and an apology from
Congress and the President came funds to “educate” the public. “The
fund should be administered by a board, the majority of whose members
are Americans of Japanese descent ....” [PJD;
463-464]
Five
million
dollars were initially set-aside for this purpose. More was to come.
Just why, one wonders, was it necessary to have the majority of the
board people of Japanese ancestry. Perhaps for racial reasons?
The
five
million was spent setting up The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund (CLPEF) to “sponsor a grants program aimed at educating the
public.” Government establishment of a story followed by government
sponsorship and propagation of the story was the order of the day.
The
form
this public education would take was made abundantly clear in the
CLPEF brochure, which specified terminology to be used in grant
applications and recommended for public.
… it [CLEPF] strongly urges grant
applicants and the public at large to discontinue the usage of such
terms as ‘relocation’ ‘evacuation’ and ‘assembly center’…. Rather
than ‘evacuation’ or relocation’ the following terms…are more
accurate: ‘imprisonment, incarceration, internment, detention,
confinement or lockup’…. rather than ‘relocation camps,’ ‘internment
camps, detention camps, prison camps or concentration camps’ is more
accurate. [412; 5]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=412&pagenum=5
It
takes
little imagination to figure out how many grant applications in
support of “public education” were approved that didn’t first use the
approved terminology and toe to the approved story line.
Direct
Government Propaganda Support
Government
institutions
were also enlisted in the “public education” effort. The Smithsonian
Institution for almost 15 years presented a historically flawed
exhibition on the subject. It was closed shortly after the National
Museum of American History was forced to admit to gross inaccuracies.
[431; 58]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00431&search_id=&pagenum=58
This
outrageous
exhibition was partly paid for by a former World War II Class A
Japanese war criminal, Ryoichi Sasakawa,
an indication of the Smithsonian’s historical objectivity. [431; 47]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00431&search_id=&pagenum=47
[Readers
who
would like to understand the lengths the Smithsonian went to trying to
ignore the critique made by the author and his son are invited to read
the exchange of letters at [431; 49 -60]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00431&search_id=133328&pagenum=49
[Note
the
references to how hard the Smithsonian worked, how they won awards,
how they ignored official records, how they relied on authority
references, and how they placed opinion over fact.]
The
National
Archives and others were also engaged in the propaganda effort.
Other
Sources of Funds
When
the
Federal Government’s five million dollars ran out California offered
up 1 million a year only for grants that parroted the politically
correct narrative. Washington State had its own smaller fund. In no
case was any money used to uncover the underlying reasons for the
evacuation. [See list of grants]
https://www.library.ca.gov/grants/cclpep/listrecipients.html
It
goes
without saying that no grants were given other than to support the
politically correct historical version.
Later
the
federal government made available $38 million in matching funds for
the cause. Since then, museums and historical sites have been
established and a myriad of other activities sponsored, all to
propagate the accepted and politically correct version of history.
In
recent
years the National Park Service has become involved in preserving
relocation sites and supporting various related projects with grants.
[See grant project summaries]
http://www.nps.gov/jacs/projects.html
No
Dissent Allowed
Dissent
or
fact-based scholarship contrary to the Commission’s report has been
viciously and publicly attacked. This is a technique universally used
to support politically correct stories.
As
an
example, when former Rep. Coble of North Carolina opined on a radio
talk show that some Japanese Americans benefitted from the relocation
because they had lost their ability to earn a living after the attack
on Pearl Harbor, a point that is demonstrably true, [204; 3: 425; 78]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00204&search_id=&pagenum=3
and
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=425&pagenum=78
he
was
viciously attacked by a nationwide cabal of Asian Americans. Tens of
thousands of faxes and phone calls were sent to the House leadership
urging he be removed from his committee chairmanship, among other
things.
Similar
action
was taken against Michelle Malkin, whose
book, In Defense of Internment,
was met with irrational outrage by some of the same people who savaged
Rep. Coble. At Berkeley she faced continuous screaming, banging on
doors, chanting and virulent hostility before, during and after her
presentation. No one must be allowed to contradict the politically
correct version of history.
Government
Scholarship
Government
publications
and programs relating to the evacuation have been flawed by their
conformity to the Commission’s report. The scholarship in most cases
has been particularly egregious, more worthy of Josef Goebbels than a
government and academic enterprise.
And,
predictably,
there are always the charges of racism, prejudice and hatred: terms
routinely used to silence individuals who dare speak out, question or
disparage the politically correct version of history.
Damage
to the Country
A
serious effect of the widespread acceptance of the approved version of
history is the charge that if it happened once it could and probably
would again. Continual focus on race-centered motivation and action,
true or not, suppresses a realistic evaluation of threats as they
apply to different groups.
Shortly
after
the 9/11 attack there was a continual drumbeat warning about the
Japanese experience and cautioning against a repeat, even though no
such evacuation was contemplated. Consider the decades long aversion
to identifying Islamic Terrorists as Islamic Terrorists largely
because they belong to a sub-group in the country. Fearing to call
something what it is because you might be called a racist limits the
ability to guard against it.
It
is
no coincidence that Islamic groups and Japanese Americans have in some
cases joined to strengthen supposed bonds between the two groups.
Incorporation
into School Curricula
Perhaps
most
disturbing of all is the effort that has been ongoing since 1987 to
inject this flawed version of history into America’s classrooms.
Lesson-plans, support materials, textbook entries and a myriad of
programs have been introduced at all levels of education. One can
fairly wonder if the object of such an effort wasn’t the questioning
in students minds of American institutions. A special course on the
subject lasting six weeks was tested at a middle school on Bainbridge
Island, WA, site of the first evacuation in 1942.
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/bainbridge/bainbridge1.php
We
are
to the point today that when the subject of the evacuation of Japanese
is discussed, reported on or portrayed in the media people’s eyes
glaze over and the embedded phraseology comes forth: Worst civil
rights violation since slavery; no military justification; not one
disloyal; racism, war hysteria and lack or political will; locked up
for the duration of the war; ill treated; and so on ad nauseam.
Embellishment
of Mythology
That
over
the years since the Commission’s report was first published, there has
been little or no additional or different information concerning the
reasons for the evacuation, its conduct and the living conditions of
those involved, is a pretty impressive indication that the story told
is one that cannot suffer real scholarship or amplification. Even
today, 32 years after the publication of PJD,
almost every news story or article concerning the evacuation parrots
the same misinformation found in the report. This is a sure sign of
propaganda, not history.
Policing
Thought in Academia
I
have personally discussed with students in high school, college and
post-graduate work their difficulty in finding faculty support for
projects to investigate the possibility that there might be more to
the story. To even suggest that there is, is generally anathema in the
academic community.
Squelching
inquiry
has no place in historical inquiry.
The
Stage is Set
Understanding
the
background of the politically correct version of this historical event
sets the stage for understanding why it happened, what really happened
and what cannot in today’s America be told.
Finally,
it
is important to remember that the situation that existed in the U.S.
at the beginning of WW II was far different from what it is today and
that the Japanese of that era were also different.
The
Wall
Street Journal on the 70th anniversary of the end of WW II
characterized wartime rulers of Japan as “a fanatical regime devoted
to racial purity and superiority. Far from liberating Asia, Tokyo
exercised totalitarian control over its colonies, forcing subjects to
adopt Japanese names, language, culture and history,” in short, a
truly racist dictatorship. Japan’s ardent supporters in the United
States before and during WW II shared its ideology and goals. [WSJ,
Sept 17, 2015, p A10]
Since
1931
Japan had been engaged in aggressive war in Manchuria and later in
China. The conduct of their soldiers regarding the brutal treatment of
Chinese was well known around the world. So, too, was their use of
ex-patriots in support of their war efforts especially during
conquests in the Pacific.
The
story
of the threat and evacuation begins.
Contemporary
Evidence
Having
criticized
the Commission for its shoddy review of the intelligence situation
leading up to the evacuation, it seems proper to discuss what was
known at the time the decision to evacuate was made. This brief review
will cover only those documents in internmentarchives.com, which were
discovered by David Lowman in the 1980’s and by my sons and I at
various archives. All Magic messages are taken from “Magic Background
of Pearl Harbor,” a Defense Department publication.
I
ask the reader as he goes through the various intelligence reports to
carefully look for any signs of racism and hysteria.
The
Origins of Magic
In
late
September 1940 a small team from the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence
Service broke Japan’s highest-level diplomatic code. Shortly after,
using only analytic reasoning, the team under the direction of Frank
B. Rollett was able to construct an
analog machine that reproduced the functions of the machine used by
the Japanese to encrypt and decrypt their messages. Thus, whatever
messages we could intercept we could quickly decrypt and read. Our
machines were built for just over $600 a piece by Navy technicians. A
photo of this marvelous machine is at [318]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=318&pagenum=
From
then
until after the end of the war the U.S. was able to quickly read
Japanese messages sent from Tokyo to and received from its diplomatic
posts all over the world. Because this feat of intelligence prowess
seemed to be something conjured up by magicians, the highly sensitive
information thus gained was cover-named Magic.
Magic
was
one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war and only a select
few were given direct access to it. It was not until 1977 that most of
its messages were declassified and made public.
Establishing
an Japanese Intelligence Operation
On
January
31, 1941 Message #44 from Tokyo to Washington revealed Japan’s plan to
establish intelligence operations in the U.S. The plan called for
collection of political, economic and military information. The
message included a caution on the use of “resident nationals,” meaning
Japanese citizens living in the U.S., and their children who were
referred to as Nisei, U.S. citizens. Tokyo urged that caution be taken
in their use “In view of the fact that if there is any slip in this
phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable
persecution…” [416:6]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=416&pagenum=6
The
message
further said that “In the event of U.S. participation in the war, our
intelligence set-up will be moved to Mexico…. set up facilities for a
U.S. Mexico international intelligence route.”
Progress
in Development
In
May
1941, in response to an order to submit progress reports on efforts to
establish intelligence networks, two Japanese consulates (Los Angeles
and Seattle) chose to send theirs by encrypted telegraphic messages
that were intercepted and decrypted by the U.S.
Los
Angeles
reported:
We are doing everything in our power to
establish outside contacts in connection with our efforts to gather
intelligence material.
We have already established contacts
with absolutely reliable Japanese in the San Pedro and San Diego
area, who will keep a close watch on all shipments of airplanes and
other war materials, and report the amounts and destinations of such
shipments. The same steps have been taken with regard to traffic
across the U.S. – Mexico border.
We shall maintain connection with
our second generations [Nisei, U.S. citizens] who are at present in
the (U.S.) Army, to keep us informed of various developments in the
Army. We also have connections with our second generations working
in airplane plants for intelligence purposes. [416:7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00416&search_id=&pagenum=7
Seattle
reported:
We are securing intelligences
concerning the concentration of warships within the Bremerton Naval
Yard, information with regard to mercantile shipping and airplane
manufacturer (sic) movements of military forces, as well as that
which concerns troop maneuvers.
With this as a basis, men are sent out
into the field …and such intelligences will be wired to you…. For
the future we have made arrangements to collect intelligences from
second generation Japanese draftees on matters dealing with troops….
In order to contact Americans of
foreign extraction and foreigners … for the collection of
intelligences… we are making use of a second generation Japanese
lawyer. [416:8]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00416&search_id=&pagenum=8
Shortly
after
these messages were intercepted a warning was sent to consulates
telling them to use more secure means, such as couriers, for
organizational progress reports in the future. However, while a large
number of operational reports concerning ship movements, aircraft
production, etc. were later intercepted which revealed the ongoing and
widespread intelligence effort along the West Coast, no further
messages revealing sources, methods or people involved were retrieved.
[418; 2-7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00418&search_id=&pagenum=002
Handwriting
on the Wall
It
was
clear, however, that intelligence gathering networks were already
established on the West Coast using both Japanese citizens and
American-born, U.S. citizens, of Japanese ancestry. And it was logical
to assume that during the next six months leading up to the Pearl
Harbor attack efforts were made to improve and expand the operations.
Of course, if two consulates had established intelligence-gathering
networks, as directed by Tokyo, it was likely all the others had too.
Here
it
might be appropriate to mention the claim made by many that since the
number of Magic messages dealing with intelligence gathering by U.S.
Japanese, represented a small percentage of all Magic messages that
threat should be minimized. The response to this specious construct
is: How many more than one message outlining espionage operations is
needed? None!
Other
Sources Regarding the Threat
All
the
while various U.S. intelligence organizations were gathering
information on Japanese operations. These included the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI), the Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID)
and the FBI.
More
traditional
means of U.S. intelligence gathering provided a good deal of
information concerning the Japanese intelligence efforts and likely
response to any future conflict.
Japanese
Organizations
An
October
14, 1941 War Department, Military Intelligence Division (MID) Memo,
“Subject: Japanese Ex-Service Men’s Organizations,” reported that the
Japanese Military Service Men League has “7,200 members in Northern
California, Washington and Utah.” Membership “includes military age nisei [sic] [U.S. citizens] as well as Japanese aliens,” and that while all
give money to the Japanese War Fund “others [are] engaged in
intelligence activities.”
Along
with
the Imperial Comradeship Society, which is the same in nature as the
Service Men League, “these two organizations have pledged to do
sabotage (railroads and harbors) in the states mentioned above, in
time of emergency…. Sixty-nine local units…are said to be carrying on
activities.” [426:7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=426&pagenum=7
In
the
early days of the war, no doubt based on information gleaned from
intercepted messages and such reports, Japanese Americans were removed
from active duty army units and jobs in aircraft plants. Later they
were prohibited from work on railroads and in mines.
A
Final Summary Before War
On
December
4, 1941, three days before Pearl Harbor, the Office of Naval
Intelligence published a 26-page summary on the subject “Japanese
Intelligence and Propaganda in the United States During 1941.” [425:5]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=425&pagenum=5
This
report
is of particular importance to anyone interested in the history of the
evacuation and its causes. It seems a pretty comprehensive review of
what our government knew about Japanese intelligence and propaganda
operations in the U.S. and Hawaii as of Pearl Harbor even though it
admits to being “incomplete.” [425; 32]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=32
The
report
included some information gleaned from Magic intercepts, as did
several reports from MID, but without attribution to its source. Often
this sharing of important information was done under the guise of
saying that it came from “a usually reliable source,” Of course the
information thus shared did not have the urgency or certainty it would
have had had the actual source of the information been revealed.
Among
many
other issues the report discusses dual citizenship of Japanese
children born in the U.S. and their obligation under Japanese law to
serve in the imperial armed forces.
It is important to note that the
categories of those eligible for military service in Japan include
males with dual citizenship (Japanese born in the United States
after 1924 whose birth was registered with the Japanese Consulate
within fourteen days). Under Japanese law, those persons are just as
liable to answer to the military authorities as are full Japanese
citizens. [425; 21-22]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=21
The
report
estimated that “[O]ut of a total Japanese
population of 320,000 in the United States and its possessions…more
than 127,000 have dual citizenship.” And that “more than 52% of
American born Japanese fall into this category.” [425:20]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=20
Military
Type Organizations
The
report
also discusses a number of “military” type organizations including the
Southern California War Veterans, Japanese Naval Association,
Patriotic Society, Military Virtue Society of North America,
Association of Japanese in North America Eligible for Military Duty
[meaning military duty in the Imperial Japanese forces, emphasis
added] and Reserve Officers Club, [425; 30]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=30
some
of
which were known, through the arrest of Commander Tachibana, a
Japanese agent working in California, to be “supplying him with
intelligence information to be sent to Japan.” [425:18]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=18
An
example
of how one of these organization operated can be found in FBI records
from Salt Lake City, Utah dated January 30, 1942. [47]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00047&search_id=&pagenum=1
The
prospectus
for the Heimusha Kai of Utah dated April
1938 claims:
We are the most patriotic, second to
none, but still we are residing in a foreign country and unable to
serve the country of our origin directly… All we Japanese brothers
are expressing our loyalty to our own country… This is a part of our
duty since we are unable to serve in action….
We demand you to cooperate with this
help to the fatherland in the time of this emergency.
Regular members are from the
able-bodied men to 47 years who are eligible for military
conscription but deferred.
Even
though
Utah was not one of the states affected by the evacuation order, it
had a sizeable Japanese community and strong emotions of loyalty to
Japan were sometimes present.
David
R.
Lyon, later a colonel in the Army, was a young man located at Bingham
Canyon, Utah on the morning of the Pearl Harbor attack. In the third
paragraph of his statement he says “That morning, feeling far more
loyalty to Japan in the conflict just begun, some young men of
Japanese backgrounds armed themselves and headed for the main repair
shops of the Kennicott Copper Company, to
kill Americans” and that “the young Japanese were disarmed by some of
their elders, not without some violence.” He describes emotions on
both sides as being high, but the U. S. was the country being
attacked. [150]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=150&pagenum=
Language
Schools
Japanese
Language
Schools were another subject covered by the report. Recall the
teaching in Sen. Inouye’s school mentioned earlier. There were more
than 39,000 students in similar schools in Hawaii. [425:18]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=18
Other
Reports, Other Agencies
Other
reports
from the FBI, The Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military
Intelligence Division covered myriad other intelligence gathering
activities taking place. Such organizations as the Tokyo Club
Syndicate [425:33]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=33
and
various
fishing interests along the West Coast were featured.
Of
particular
interest may be the memorandum from General Mark Clark, Assistant
Chief of Staff, to Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy,
dated February 12, 1942, transmitting Information Bulletin Number 6 on
Japanese Espionage. [424; 11-14]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00424&search_id=&pagenum=11
The
memo
reveals McCloy’s interest in the subject
and Clark’s intention in sending the information to “be of assistance
to you in settling this question.”
Note
the
date of McCloy’s conversation with Clark
was February 12, 1942. This was the day after the President’s decision
to evacuate all Japanese from the West Coast. While the subject of
Clark’s Memo is “Enemy Aliens on the West Coast,” the attached
Information Bulletin is entitled “Japanese Espionage” and in paragraph
6 (b) states “Their espionage net containing Japanese aliens, first
and second generation Japanese and other nationals is now thoroughly
organized and working underground.” [424; 14]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00424&search_id=&pagenum=14
A
reasonable person might conclude that the President’s decision to
evacuate was intended to stop this activity and not made because of
how certain people looked.
Those
familiar
with the operations of overseas Japanese in countries invaded by
Imperial forces can well imagine the sorts of intelligence activities
being carried on in the U.S. in the run-up to the attack on Pearl
Harbor.
Another
Estimate of the Threat
The
concern
over invasion of the West Coast or disruption of sea traffic in the
area was reflected in the importance placed on preventing Japanese
fishermen familiar with those waters from providing their knowledge to
the Japanese government. Some in our government thought preventing
their return to Japan on the exchange ship Gripsholm was “well worth the loss of all the Americans now in the Far East.”
[426; 16]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00426&search_id=&pagenum=016
The
reader
may ask if ONI officials felt it was worth “the loss of all the
Americans now in the Far East,” more than 5,000 souls in the
Philippines alone, to keep so-called ‘Japanese Fishermen’ from
returning to Japan with the information they possessed, if it wasn’t
worth it to evacuate all Japanese from the West Coast to keep
approximately 10,000 from getting into mischief during the war?
PJD Reference to 5th Columns
It
is
interesting to note that while PJD highlights the 5th column activities in Norway as having a possible
influence on decision makers, it fails to mention Japan’s uniform and
extensive use of expatriates in their many attacks at the beginning of
the war.
What
was Known and What the Public was Told
Of
course,
none of the information in these reports, except perhaps some of the
most innocuous and of lowest classification was ever released to the
public during the war and then only as plausible justification for the
decision to evacuate the Japanese.
Gen.
DeWitt’s Final Report on the
evacuation, which was criticized by the Commission and others, is a
case in point. He would certainly not have included in his report any
information that would have benefited the enemy or revealed the extent
or sources of our knowledge of Japanese intelligence operations. To
assume otherwise and to judge the evacuation as being unjustified
based on what DeWitt made public is unreasonable.
Yet
that
is precisely what was done. The War Relocation Authority historian
Ruth McKee in her Wartime Exile,
dwells on the issue of the Federal Communications Commission’s
refutation of ship to shore radio traffic cited by DeWitt in his
report. [174; 157-161]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=174&pagenum=157
The
same
issue was rehashed in PJD for the same reason, to show the weakness of DeWitt’s justification
for evacuation. Apparently, after the fact, and in the case of PJD, way after the fact, if one claim of Japanese misconduct can be
refuted, all the others including those that are still unknown can be
dismissed.
Much
of
wartime intelligence was not declassified until years later and Magic
intercepts were only declassified in 1977.
The
Commission’s “Evidence”
The
Commission
dealt only with information made public during the early days of the
war and made no reference to contemporary intelligence reports that
had since been declassified. Instead it relied on opinions from
assumed knowledgeable sources when making its determination that there
was no military necessity for the evacuation. This was one of its most
glaring weaknesses.
RELOCATION
AND
INTERNMENT
The
attack
on Pearl Harbor changed history for our country. We were at war with
Japan and shortly would be with Germany and Italy. Our economy had to be restructured to a wartime footing. The
result was a major disruption of lives, dislocation of people, and the
attendant hardships affecting all citizens of the country.
With
the
Pacific Fleet crippled, Hawaii exposed, and the West Coast poorly
defended, there was considerable concern over the threat posed from
within by those of Japanese ancestry. Since the Japanese had
successfully used their expatriates in other countries to aid in their
invasions, America’s leaders feared the same could happen here.
Although our government knew from intercepted Magic messages and other
intelligence sources that many Japanese and Japanese-Americans were
actively involved in Japan’s wartime intelligence efforts, it didn’t
know exactly how many and which individuals were involved.
A
Practical, Not an Ideal, Solution to the Problem
Because
of
the enormous scope of the problem and the need to remove the threat as
quickly as possible it wasn’t practical to use traditional law
enforcement mechanisms or deal with people on an individual basis. The
only way the country could protect itself in a timely manner was to
order the evacuation of all Japanese and Japanese-Americans from the
West Coast and deal with the issue of individual loyalty later.
Recall
that
Edward Ennis, based on information from Lt. Cmdr. Ringle and others, estimated 10,000 people needed to be evacuated, but there
was no certainty that all those who might do the U.S. harm would be
included in that number.
Enemy
Aliens
The
first
action came not only against the Japanese, but also against German and
Italian citizens, who the FBI also suspected of being dangerous enemy
aliens.
Presidential
Proclamation
2525 dated December 8, 1941, recall from the previous discussion,
classified all citizens of Japan 14 years of age and older as “alien
enemies” and stripped them of their protections under the U.S.
Constitution, making them subject to internment and confiscation of
property without legal restraint.
Similar
proclamations
did the same for Germans and Italian citizens. The Commission and its
report all but ignored the implications of this classification and the
difference between Japanese citizens and American born Japanese who
were U.S. citizens.
Those
rounded
up by the FBI throughout the country were given a hearing before
boards of prominent citizens at locations around the country, which
could recommend their internment for the duration of the war in
Department of Justice detention centers, their placement in relocation
centers or release. [125]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=125&pagenum=
This
procedure
applied to Japanese citizens, alien enemies, only. No U.S. citizens
were involved.
Although
all
enemy aliens were subject to “internment” under the provisions of the
Alien Enemies Act of 1798 and the Presidential Proclamation, the
United States actually interned only a small percentage of its
Japanese nationals, those who had been considered security risks by an
Enemy Alien Control Boards.
Often,
because
of a lack of more concrete evidence against individuals, they were
interned, and done so legally, based on their position of leadership
within an organization or activity in the Japanese community. About 2,600 Japanese were interned out of a total of 126,947
persons of Japanese ancestry in the U.S. [8:93]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=8&pagenum=93
The
Treatment of Families
The
U.S.
Government allowed families of those interned to voluntarily join them
in Department of Justice Detention Facilities. Until early 1945 there
were approximately the same number of Japanese and Germans interned,
along with their families, about 11,000. [102]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=102&pagenum=
Internment
as Opposed to Relocation
Internment
denoted
incarceration for the duration of hostilities and was employed against
“enemy aliens” in all warring countries. For example, the Imperial
Japanese Army interned Americans as “enemy aliens” in the Philippines.
Internment
is
frequently confused with and equated to relocation. The two were
different. Internment was incarceration for the duration of the war;
relocation was movement to a center from which relocation to a new
situation of work and living was intended. The equation of the two
different situations in the popular mind is a measure of the
effectiveness of the politically correct propaganda effort.
In
early
1945, 5,589 Nisei (U.S. citizens by birth) also joined the ranks of
the interned because they renounced their U.S. citizenship thus
becoming “alien enemies.” The final total for Japanese interned then
was over 16,000, a majority of whom were family members who had
volunteered to live with their father/husband.
The
Geneva Convention
All
those
interned were afforded protection under the provisions of the Geneva
Convention even though its provisions did not apply to enemy aliens.
This was done in the hope that Japan would reciprocate. [322; 2]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=322&pagenum=2
[119;
1-10]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00119&search_id=&pagenum=1
[116;
1-2]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00116&search_id=&pagenum=1
The
last
reference reports the Imperial Japanese Government agreeing to apply
the Geneva Convention to those it interned as enemy aliens. It did
not. Japan’s cruelty to internees is but a footnote in its history of
brutality to those under its control during the war.
Regular
Visits by the Spanish Government and Red Cross
Detention
facilities
housing enemy aliens and their families were regularly visited by
representatives of the Spanish Government, who looked out for Japanese
interests, and by the International Red Cross who passed on complaints
they received from internees to the U.S. Government for investigation.
One
such
frivolous complaint, which demonstrates the horrors of American
internment, was made about being forced to eat long-grain, white rice,
instead of the medium grain variety preferred by Japanese. [192: 2]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=192&pagenum=2
This
was
at a time when Americans interned and imprisoned in POW camps by the
Japanese in Asia were being neglected, starved, abused, tortured and
murdered.
It
may
be of interest to the reader that in an effort to accommodate Japanese
tastes, close to 40 percent of the annual U.S. rice harvest was used
by the War Relocation Authority in relocation centers. [177; 52]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=177&pagenum=52
Hawaii
Japanese-Americans
and
Japanese in Hawaii were treated differently from those on the West
Coast. Instead of evacuation, Hawaii was placed under Martial Law.
This solution provided the necessary security, because Hawaii
consisted of islands that were easily controlled, and still allowed
the large Japanese work force on the islands to be employed in wartime
activities. However,
1,118 individuals were evacuated to relocation centers on the mainland
[2:23]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=23
and
several
hundred were taken into custody and interned in Department of Justice
detention centers. [258:1]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=258&pagenum=1
It
is
of some significance that shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor the
President indicated his desire “to have all of the Japanese aliens in
the Hawaiian Islands interned at once.” A subsequent assessment of
wartime needs led to a revision of that directive and martial law was
chosen in stead. This is but one example of how wartime decisions
changed based on new information and changing situations. [426; 15]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=426&pagenum=15
West
Coast
Although
Martial
law was appropriate in the case of Hawaii it was not for the West
Coast where it would have severely restricted war production
activities existing there.
President
Roosevelt’s
decision to evacuate all people of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast was formally published when he signed Executive Order 9066 on
February 19, 1942. The
popular version of the event is that the evacuation consisted of
rounding them all up, shipping them out, and keeping them interned for
the duration of the war, and generally treating them poorly, which is
not true.
In
fact,
the evacuation affected only those of Japanese ancestry living in
Washington and Oregon, California, and the southern part of Arizona.
Japanese in other parts of the country were unaffected except for 219
individuals who petitioned the government to be allowed to reside in
the relocation centers, no doubt a first in the worldwide history of
“concentration camps.”[2; 23]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=23
The
Evacuation, How it Was Done
Evacuating
approximately
120,000 people from the West Coast was no small effort especially
considering all the other war related and affected activities that
were going on simultaneously. Yet it was a well planned and executed
operation. Those interested in the details of the planning and
execution are encouraged to review Gen. DeWitt’s Final Report. [8]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=8&pagenum=
Evacuation
was
generally carried out in three phases. First, those to be evacuated
were urged to leave the exclusion area voluntarily and move to the
interior of the country. By March 29, 1942 only 9,000 had left of
their own accord. [8; 118]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00008&search_id=&paenum=118
When
it
became clear that voluntary evacuation wouldn’t get the job done, the
government decided to move the rest of the people into 10 relocation
centers located in the western U.S., from which they could be
relocated to the interior once a suitable work and living situation
was found. It was no coincidence that the first two areas evacuated
were San Pedro and Bainbridge Island, the two areas mentioned in the
intercepted Magic messages outlining espionage organizing and efforts.
Assembly
Centers
Since
the
President placed a priority on swift action, those to be evacuated
were first moved to Assembly Centers at facilities such as fairgrounds
and racetracks along the West Coast, where some accommodations already
existed and others could be quickly built. A small number of people moved directly to what was to become
the Manzanar Relocation Center in
Southern California.
Much
has
been made of the types of accommodations used at Assembly Centers. At Tanforan Race Track in the Bay Area, for
example some evacuees were housed in horse stalls. The same stalls
used to quarter U.S. Marines at other times. Each had running water,
by the way.
Who
Was in Charge?
The
Army
handled the movement to assembly centers and thereafter to relocation
centers, when they were built. After arrival at the relocation center,
the War Relocation Authority (WRA) took charge. It was an agency
initially formed under the Executive Office of the President and in
1943 transferred to the Department of the Interior.
The
Commission’s False Claim
PJD makes the claim “Families could take to the assembly centers and the
camps only what they could carry.” [PJD 11] This is an outright lie. Families brought with them anything that
could be carried to pickup points where they boarded buses to the
assembly centers. Their
baggage was loaded on trucks and moving vans and taken to the centers.
See photos at [311]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00311&search_id=&pagenum=1
and
judge
for yourself whether the Commission’s claim is true.
Conditions
in Assembly Centers
Some
centers
even had commercial dishwashing equipment. There were center
newspapers, movies and other recreational activities. A tremendous
effort was made by the U.S. Government to provide amenities to the
Japanese who were relocated despite the fact that the Japanese
government did not reciprocate with the Americans under its control
during the war.
Another
False Claim
Claims
are
also made about being able to only take two suitcases on the trains to
Relocation Centers. In fact, only two could be taken aboard the
passenger cars. The rest had to be placed in the two baggage cars that
accompanied each train. Petty fabrications of this sort support the
Commission harsh narrative of the event but detract from its
credibility.
Trains
transporting
evacuees to the Relocation Centers had dining cars if two or more
meals were required in transit. Lunches were provided for shorter
trips. Baggage that could not be accommodated in two baggage cars was
forwarded to the Relocation Center by freight. Sleeping accommodations were provided for the elderly, infirm
and women with babies. [8:296]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00008&search_id=&pagenum=296
Speaking
of
trains to Relocation Centers:
Provision had to be made on the
trains for mothers with infants, pregnant women, invalids and bed
cases. Detailed instructions for use by the train doctor had to be
prepared for each patient on the train. In fact, the medical records
of all persons on a given train went with that particular train.
Emergency medical supplies, strained baby foods, baby formulas,
disposable diapers, and numerous other special items had to be
provided. [177; 66-67]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00177&search_id=&pagenum=66
Who
Handled What?
Various
governmental
agencies were used to handle issues related to the evacuation and to
lessen the impact on those involved. The Federal Reserve handled evacuee property and the
protection and the storage of all types of personal property. The
oft-heard claim that those evacuated “lost everything” is another
myth. A major effort was made to preserve their property and secure
that which was left behind on evacuation. See [5]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=5&pagenum=
for
a
detailed accounting of the effort
The
Farm
Security Administration handled the disposal of crops in the field,
arranged storage for farm equipment and settled leases. For a first-hand account of how this was done see [1].
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=1&pagenum=
The
Federal
Security Agency was responsible for providing all necessary social and
public health services. The U.S. Public Health Service examined “each
evacuee for communicable diseases…undertook the acquisition of
infirmary and hospital equipment and medical supplies for Assembly
Centers”, and supervised the entire medical program within the
centers. Also involved were, among others, the U.S. Employment
Services and, U.S. Post Office.
Relocation
Centers
After
they
were built evacuees were assigned to Relocation Centers largely based
on the area of the West Coast they came from. The Centers were constructed along the lines of a
semi-permanent Army facility. Housing
blocks included 12 barrack buildings 20’ x 100’ divided into family
apartments. Each block
included a mess hall/kitchen, a recreation building and an H shaped
building with toilet and bath facilities for men and women and a
laundry room and a heater room. [8:272]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=8&pagenum=272
Even
the
design of the hospitals demonstrated the measure of care taken to
provide evacuees with suitable facilities. The average hospital was a
250-bed facility and its buildings provided space for the principal
medical activities carried on in any metropolitan community. Such facilities included modern surgeries, obstetrical and
isolation wards, X-ray rooms, a morgue and a full-equipped laundry. All buildings were steam heated. [8:272]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=8&pagenum=272
No
other
“concentration camps” in the world’s history were so well equipped.
Included
in
the administrative area of the center was a refrigerated warehouse. Schools, churches and recreational facilities were also
central to the complex. Banks,
post offices, stores, beauty parlors, newspapers, and other facilities
usually found in a small community were provided. For an early edition
of the Manzanar Free Press) [See [199]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=199&pagenum=
For
a
copy of the Manzanar High School yearbook
see: [3]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00003&search_id=136015&pagenum=1
Evacuees
were
given paying jobs, and after an initial settling in period, were
granted the freedom to visit local towns. [145:5]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=145&pagenum=5
See
[313]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00313&search_id=&pagenum=1
and
[314]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=314&pagenum=
for
photos
from Topaz and Tule Lake centers.
How
the Centers Operated
Evacuees
upon
arrival at Relocation Centers were assigned family apartments based on
the number of family members. Food
was served cafeteria fashion, and was based on the Army subsistence
rate of 50 cents per day ($7.06 in 2012 dollars), and an effort was
made to accommodate the tastes of the evacuees. [8:196]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=8&pagenum=196
Tofu
and
pickling factories were established and run by the evacuees. [177; 54]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=177&pagenum=54
Evacuees
ate
in block mess halls. Special arrangements were made for baby and
infant feeding.
‘block mothers’ … operated block
feeding stations. The station was a corner in the block messhall equipped with a refrigerator where milk and perishables were kept.
Besides, there was a small stock of other necessities. Upon written
orders from the doctors, the station issued strained vegetables,
milk, Pablum, oranges, dextri-maltose
and other baby foods to parents with small children These feeding
stations were under the joint direction of the hospital and the mess
operations staff. [177; 54]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=177&pagenum=54
It
must
be acknowledged that while considerable effort was made to accommodate
the needs of evacuees, the conditions and circumstances they lived
under were sometimes less than ideal, as they were in many other parts
of the country at the time.
Some
Had it Much Better
Japanese
government
officials and businessmen on the East Coast who were apprehended right
after Pearl Harbor were confined to the Greenbrier Resort in West
Virginia. The same could not be done for everyone. At the same time it
should be remembered that the conditions in relocation centers and the
restrictions evacuees lived under were often much better than those
afforded our servicemen and many civilians living in a nation
disrupted by war.
Community
Government
As
could
be expected in any such mass movement there were problems. Establishing a community government under democratic
principles was not without its tribulations, but on the whole the
centers were effectively run. [176]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=176&pagenum=
provides
detailed
coverage of the effort.
Relocation
It
was
never intended that relocation centers were to be permanent places of
residence. Their purpose was to provide a temporary place for people
to reside until suitable situations of jobs, housing or school could
be found for them in the states outside the exclusion area.
The
frequently
heard claim that evacuees were “interned” for the duration of the war
is false.
Over
4,000
students, both U.S. citizens and Japanese, were relocated to colleges
and universities during the course of the war. The program was
organized by a coalition brought together by the American Friends
Service Committee and the National Student Relocation Council.
[178:14]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=178&pagenum=14
For
others,
even before relocation offices were formally opened, resettlement
committees had been established in many mid-western cities to assist
in the relocation process. Groups
of concerned individuals, often from churches, formed these
committees. By the close
of FY 1943 the War Relocation Authority had setup 42 of its own
relocation offices. They were scattered from Spokane to Boston.
[178:20]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00178&search_id=&pagenum=20
Efforts,
individual
and governmental, were made to develop situations in interior states
that would allow for resettlement of Japanese Americans and Japanese.
But, it must be admitted that there was some resistance to
resettlement, sometimes from strange places. A March 23, 1942 letter
from the Japanese American Citizens League of Ogden Utah to the
governor of Utah details their objections to resettlement of “evacuees
from the restricted coastal areas.” [426; 12]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=426&pagenum=12
Several
problems
slowed relocation, but by the end of December 1944 35,989 individuals
had been relocated on indefinite and terminal (permanent) leave.
[2:45]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=45
Considering
the
number of children and old folks involved in the evacuation, this
number represented a significant portion of those who could both work
and speak English.
Reality vs. Mythology
Since
the
days of the Commission and the publication of PJD there has been a never-ending stream of horror stories told
about conditions in relocation centers. It is revealing to note what
happened when the evacuation order was lifted and efforts began to
close the centers and move the evacuees back to the West Coast.
… there developed during the summer and
early fall [1945] a mounting volume of criticism from groups and
individuals who had previously cooperated closely in carrying out
the program. This
‘friendly opposition,’ as it came to be called inside the agency,
was centered primarily in Los Angeles County and, to a somewhat
lesser extent, in the San Francisco Bay Area. It was ‘spark-plugged’
and stimulated, WRA feels certain, to a very large degree by alert
young Nisei who had relocated throughout the country and were
enjoying the financial advantage of having their parents maintained
at government expense in relocation centers.
… the ‘friendly oppositionists’
worked with great persistence and ingenuity throughout the summer
and fall to prevent the WRA from carrying out its schedule of center
closings. Large volumes of mail on this subject were addressed not
only to the WRA Director but also to the Secretary of the Interior
and the President. Resolutions were passed and critical articles
were written for liberal journals such as the Nation and the Christian Century. … A great deal of energy was thrown into this
campaign – energy which, WRA cannot help feeling, might better have
been expended in helping the returned evacuees to solve their
problems of personal adjustment. [187; 166]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=187&pagenum=166
Is
there
any other conclusion to draw than that it was just fine to have your
families cared for at government expense in what are now called
“infamous concentration camps” when it was to your personal advantage.
But, when later, it became advantageous to elicit sympathy in support
of a victim class, to shift blame for the evacuation, seek redress
money and get the country to apologize, these same establishments were
labeled inhumane and infamous.
Deceitful
hypocrisy
has been a hallmark of Japan’s post-war assumption of responsibility
for its roll in WW II. Apparently, this sort of conduct is not limited
to Japanese in Japan.
LOYALTY
The
issue
of loyalty, whether to Imperial Japan or the United States, was
central to the evacuation. If, as PJD claimed “There was no evidence that any individual American citizen
was actively disloyal to his country,” [PJD 28] then clearly there was no need or justification for the
evacuation.
If,
however,
evidence shows that there was disloyalty before and after the
evacuation, questions regarding the evacuation’s necessity devolve to
the judgment of those responsible for national security.
The
declarative
and unequivocal statement by the Commission that there was no evidence
of disloyalty is farcical on its face. And it follows the tone and
general approach of the Commission in making other excuses and
denials. After reading this section on loyalty, let the reader decide,
however benign his historical views of Japanese attitudes during WW II
may be, whether there was rampant disloyalty or not.
Proof
of
loyalty is not a simple matter. Loyalty can be declared, by swearing
an oath, for example, or by demonstration, by conduct and performance.
Since
loyalty
is a condition of the heart and mind it is difficult to determine and
may even be judged incorrectly should an individual in question
decline to commit one way or another. However, in times of danger,
such as during war, when trustworthiness is a paramount issue, failing
to declare or demonstrate a commitment is understandably considered a
sign of disloyalty. Declaring for the enemy leaves no doubt. This may
be an insensitive approach, but life is not fair.
Question
#28
When
on
January 28, 1943 it “was announced that the War Department would soon
create an all Nisei combat team to be composed of volunteer
Japanese-Americans including many from relocation centers…it was
decided to conduct a special registration of male Nisei, 17 years and
older at all relocation centers.”
Included
in
the questionnaire used for this purpose was question #28, the
so-called loyalty question, and a similar question was used for female
citizens.
Will you swear unqualified allegiance
to the United States of American and faithfully defend the United
States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and
forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor,
or any other foreign government, power, or organization? [2:177]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=177
Seventeen
percent
of Nisei males of service-age answered “NO” to this question, a total
of 3,421. Another 517
either qualified their answer or left it blank. 81 per-cent, or 16,435
had no problem proclaiming their loyalty to the U.S. by answering
“YES.” [2:180]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00002&search_id=&pagenum=180
Those
answering
“NO” were shortly thereafter shipped to the Tule Lake Center, which
was re-designated a segregation center.
Sensitive
Japanese; Insensitive Government
The
Commission
found the loyalty program, “did not extend the presumption of loyalty
to Americans citizens of Japanese descent…. and was conducted so
insensitively, with such a lack of understanding of the evacuees’
circumstances that it became one of the most divisive and wrenching
episodes of the camp detention.” [PJD 13]
It
was
meant to be divisive. It
was intended to divide the loyal from the disloyal, and it seemed to
work pretty well.
Repatriation
and Expatriation
During
the
transition between assembly centers and the larger, new relocation
centers the issue of repatriation (of Japanese citizens) and
expatriation (U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry) to Japan arose.
Arrangements
were
made to exchange U.S. officials in Japan for officials and others
Japanese caught by the war in the U.S. Most of those involved in the
first exchange on the Swedish liner Gripsholm were Japanese citizens living outside the exclusion area, people from
the eastern U.S., the folks who were residing at the Greenbrier
Resort.
Requests
for
repatriation or expatriation to Japan from alien enemy and Nisei
(American born) evacuees began to be accepted early in the evacuation
process. Requests continued throughout the war years, reaching a total
of 20,627, or 17 percent of those individuals under WRA control. [2;
172]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00002&search_id=&pagenum=172
A
Dramatic Increase in Requests
Requests
for
movement to Japan increased dramatically during the first three months
of 1944. [2:172]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00002&search_id=&pagenum=172
In
December
1943, 130 individuals registered for return to Japan. In January 1944
those registering rose to 5,012. February saw 1,841 and March 1,495.
This was thought by many to be the result of including Japanese
Americans in the draft for the armed forces in January 1944. The
proximate cause being that those who registered for expatriation to
Japan demonstrated where their loyalty lay, by requesting to go over
to the enemy during time of war, and were not considered acceptable
for military service.
The
two
most plausible reasons for this anomalous increase in registrations
seem to be either cowardice and draft dodging or loyalty to Japan and
a reluctance to fight for the U.S. That a vast majority of those who
registered for expatriation during the first three months of 1944 were
from Tule Lake Segregation Center speaks strongly in support of the
conclusion that cowardice, draft dodging and disloyalty were the
causes of the increase.
This
is
perhaps an insensitive position to take but certainly a common sense
one. See the analysis on this subject for the Minidoka Relocation
Center at [43: 2]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=43&pagenum=2
The
number
of requests decreased later in 1944 when the handwriting was on the
wall concerning the defeat of Japan.
The
reader
is asked to consider what other reasons there might have been for the
sharp increase in request for expatriation during the first three
months of 1944.
Registering
for the Draft
Simply
registering
for the Selective Service also raised issues of loyalty, as
illustrated by incidents that occurred during early 1943.
At
the
Jerome, AR Relocation Center:
a committee for evacuees which
conferred with Director Paul TAYLOR of the Jerome Relocation Center
on March 6, 1943 ….stated that the group [those who had failed to register for Selective Service]
had refused to register because they were loyal to
Japan….approximately 781 evacuees in the alleged disloyal group
registered by writing across the face of the registration form that
they wanted to be …expatriated to Japan. [25; 1]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=25&pagenum=1
Notice
that
an American born Buddhist priest was deeply involved in the events at
Jerome. He declared that he “is willing to do anything for Japan in an
effort to have Japan win the war, and would gladly be a member of the
Japanese armed forces fighting against the U.S.” Organizing evacuees
to incite disloyalty to the U.S. was apparently part of his
“anything.” Note, also, that this American born, fanatical son of
Nippon taught in a Japanese Language School from 1938-1943. One can
only wonder what he was teaching.
A
careful reading of the FBI memo of March 23, 1943 reveals the general
attitude of those involved and the conduct and numbers of those who
resisted registering for U.S. service. A number of other FBI documents
in the archives deal with the issue of subversive activities in the
relocation centers. [70: 1-9]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00070&search_id=&pagenum=1
The
politically
correct interpretation of the event would surely be that it was a
minority who resisted, demonstrated and evinced disloyalty (but were
not “actively disloyal” in doing so, according to PJD) and that they were forced to their position by an “insensitive”
government who did not understand their tender feelings. But it was a
significant minority, numbering in the thousands, who were not known
by name at the time of the evacuation.
The Disloyals
These
same
individuals who showed their antipathy for the U.S., and their
sympathy for Japan by their reaction to Selective Service
registration, [70]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00070&search_id=&pagenum=1
their volunteering for expatriation rather than be drafted, [2: 172]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=172
and
who
refused to swear allegiance to the U.S., [2: 180]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00002&search_id=&pagenum=180
were
also
involved in more dramatic acts of disloyalty after being moved to Tule
Lake Segregation Center.
Tule
Lake Demonstrations in Support of Japan and the Emperor
There
they
participated in and forced individuals loyal to the U.S. to
participate in pseudo military formations honoring the emperor and
supporting Imperial Japan. [315: 1-37]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=315&pagenum=
Thousands
petitioned
the U.S. Government to be sent to Japan to fight against the U.S.
[428: 3-7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00428&search_id=&pagenum=3
5,461
of
these poor, misunderstood dears renounced their U.S. citizenship. [2;
192]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=192
An
Important Letter
The
letter
to organization leaders at Tule Lake by John L. Burling, for the
Attorney General, [428; 3-7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=428&pagenum=3
is
a
significant document that deserves careful study as a summary of
disloyalty among Japanese Americans. The letter reveals, among other
things, that a large number of Japanese Americans and Japanese
petitioned the U.S. Government to be sent to Japan to fight for that
country. In the view of the Commission this may not qualify as “active
disloyalty” but there are many who would disagree. And now, we are
told they were innocent victims of “racism, hysteria and lack of
political will”
The
Burling
letter also describes the sorts of demonstrations conducted at Tule
Lake Segregation Center and it goes without saying that had such
demonstrations as described in that letter been conducted by Americans
in Japanese camps in the Far East during the war heads would have
rolled, literally.
The
idea
of people petitioning the U.S. Government to be allowed to travel to
Japan, while our country was at war with that country, in order fight
against America may be hard to grasp. However, it did happen.
Consider
the
following letter to the Secretary of the Interior by the same
organizations addressed by Burling four months earlier.
In view of the prevailing
conditions in this Center, we are forwarding this petition directly
to your office. We are appealing to your unbiased consideration and
treatment of the active members of the Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi Dan and their fundamental
objectives. Our primary objective is to expatriate or repatriate
immediately when it is physically possible so that we may be able to
contribute our war efforts during the hour of our national
emergency. While waiting patiently for the opportunity to serve our
Father Land, our secondary objective is to keep our body soul
trained and fitted equal to the jobs to be finished. [171]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00171&search_id=&pagenum=1
Note
also
in the letter an estimate by the author that there are 10,000
individuals who “…remain loyal to Japan, are forced to live among the
individuals who are loyal to the United States of America.” Another
example of Japanese sensitivities.
Disloyalty
by
a significant minority of Japanese Americans (U. S. citizens) was a
continuing feature of evacuation history. The question that any
fair-minded analyst of this historical event must ask is “what would
these several thousand U.S. citizens and the many thousands of enemy
aliens, whose sympathies lay with Japan, have been doing had they been
freely living along the West Coast during the war? They were surely a
threat: One that needed to be dealt with.
THE
PAY OFF
The
Commission,
with its flawed investigation and unsupported and irrational
conclusions about the evacuation, recommended, among other things,
that each evacuee receive an apology and a payment of $20,000. [PJD 463] With the passage of Pubic Law 100-383 in 1988 this payment
was assured.
Payment
was
made solely on the basis of being Japanese and having been affected by
either internment as an alien enemy or by the evacuation, voluntary or
enforced.
Payment
was
made to alien enemies, those who espoused loyalty to Japan, those who
petitioned the government to be returned to Japan to fight against the
U.S., those who registered for repatriation and expatriation, those
who forced loyal citizens to participate in disloyal activities, those
U.S. citizens who engaged in espionage in the army and aircraft
plants, those 5,589 who renounced their U.S. citizenship, those who
spent the war years studying at colleges and universities and those
5,981 who were born during the war, among others.
Only
Japanese Got Paid
By
including
“internment” within the criteria for payment made Japanese alien
enemies exclusively eligible, among all wartime enemy nationals who
had been legally interned during the war, in accordance with U.S. and
international law, to receive payment of reparations for their
detention. Those of European ancestry within the United States who had
been identically treated were excluded from payment solely because of
their race. Or one could say, in racial terms, solely because how they
didn’t look.
The
same
mind-set that claimed that all who were disloyal to the U.S. after the
attack on Pearl Harbor were known by name and numbered only 10,000,
and could have been interned/relocated thereby sparing all others of
Japanese ancestry evacuation, was now unable to separate all those who
had demonstrated disloyalty and were definitely known by name from
those who had proven themselves loyal. All had to be paid and in the
process the guilty were exonerated.
Stiff
the Germans and Italians
Recall
that PJD decried the difference
between the alleged benign way the Germans and Italians were treated
after the outbreak of hostilities and the way the Japanese were
treated. The clear implication was that the difference was a sure sign
of racism.
When
it
came to redressing the “terrible wrong” inflicted on the Japanese,
however, no effort was made to obtain payments for interned Germans
and their U.S. citizen children. In fact, Japanese organizations and
individuals went to court to oppose a lawsuit seeking redress by a
U.S. citizen who, as a child, had been interned in Crystal City, Texas
with his German, alien enemy parents. [98; 1]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=98&pagenum=
When
it
came to alien enemies other than Japanese internment was apparently
considered justified by those seeking redress for Japanese. No racism
there!
Going
to Great Lengths
So
thorough
was the Justice Department in tracking down persons of Japanese
ancestry eligible for payment that they advertised and even
established special phone numbers for former alien enemies and
evacuees who returned to Japan after the war so that they could
conveniently call to file a claim. [217; 1]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=217&pagenum=
One
claimant
received a court judgment awarding payment even though she was born on
June 5, 1945 about six months after her parents were relocated to New
Jersey and months after the exclusion order relating to the West Coast
was lifted. [433; 25]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=433&pagenum=25
Her
family
was on indefinite leave but the army did not individually notify them
that they were officially free to return to the West Coast, even
though it was common knowledge. The girl was born 25 days before the
end of the statutory exclusion period and thus, for her suffering,
received a $ 20,000 payment.
Perhaps
even
more egregious was the U.S. Justice Department’s ruling on September
30,1996 that American-born children of Japanese diplomats or Japanese
citizens on personal business in the U.S. at the time of Pearl Harbor
also deserved $20,000 and an apology from the United Stages for having
been interned or relocated while awaiting deportation with their
parents, most likely at Greenbrier Resort. [CFR Part 74 AG Order
No.2056-96 RIN 1190-AA42]
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1996-09-30/pdf/96-25027.pdf
A
Few Refused Payment
Altogether,
of
the approximately 80,000 Japanese eligible for payment, “approximately
twenty-nine individuals, who ORA [Office of Redress Administration]
determined to be eligible, have refused payment.” [110; 1]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=110&pagenum=
Twenty-nine
people
refusing $20,000 each is a statement of some strength against the
fraud that is PJD.
Previous
“Relief”
The
payment
under Public Law 100-383, August 10, 1988, was not the first made to
evacuated Japanese. A list of previous laws granting relief of various
sorts is at [107]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=107&pagenum=
The
list
was compiled by Arthur D. Jacobs, a U.S. citizen of German ancestry,
who was interned with his parents during the war.
Public
“Education”
As
has
already been mentioned the Commission also recommended that a public
education fund should be established.
Such a fund should sponsor research
and public educational activities so that the events which were the
subject of this inquiry will be remembered, and so that the causes
and circumstances of this and similar events may be illuminated and
understood…. the fund’s public educational activity might include
preparing and distributing the Commission’s finding about these
events to textbook publishers, educators and libraries…. The fund
should be administered by a board, the majority of whose members are
Americans of Japanese descent ... [PJD;
463-464]
Public
Law
100-383 codified that recommendation and money and government
resources started flowing in support of an approved version of
history. If the U.S. Government says there is only one approved
version of an historical event, who is to argue otherwise?
PLAYING
THE
GUILT GAME
The
exemplary
service of Japanese American servicemen during the war was used by the
Commission to imply that all Japanese Americans involved in the
evacuation were up-standing, loyal U.S. citizens. This, of course, is
about as logical as saying that because there were an estimated 10,000
Japanese who were considered a threat to the Nation, all individuals
of Japanese ancestry were also a threat.
As
that
may be, the argument that some served with distinction therefore all
were upstanding, as illogical as it is, continues to be regularly used
to this day.
Exaggeration
and
fabrication of the Japanese American war records has been a common and
continuing feature of the politically correct version of the Japanese
American WW II history. Few actions are more repulsive than claiming
credit for the wartime accomplishments of others or outright
fabricating records of accomplishment that never happened.
Documentation
of False Claims
A
1988 letter from David D. Lowman to former Chief Justice Warren
Berger, Chairman, Project ’87, U.S. Constitution Bicentennial, may be
the first iteration of the exposure of false and exaggerated claims by
Japanese Americans. [103]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=103&pagenum=
The
brazen
claim that Japanese Americans were responsible for the shoot down of
Admiral Yamamoto, supported in part by the argument that only Japanese
could decrypt and translate Japanese messages, is particularly
egregious. That easily disproven falsehood would be featured for years
at an army museum speaks to the tendency to believe everything
positive said about or claimed by Japanese Americans and disbelieve
any and all things detracting from their supposed loyalty and
accomplishments.
Marine
Major
Alva B. Lasswell was the man who
discovered and translated the Yamamoto itinerary that led to the shootdown.
He was working out of Pearl Harbor at the time.
The
Dachau Story
Another
such
claim is that the 442nd RCT liberated Dachau Concentration Camp in
Germany. This claim has been made over and over, even though the
regiment was in France not Germany at the time. The 45 Infantry
Division did the actual liberating. Columnist George Will helped
propagate this falsehood.
Smithsonian’s
Contribution
to Mythology
Smithsonian
Museum
of American History featured an exhibition that ran for almost 15
years. And it did incorporate, under its imprimatur, outrageously
false claims concerning the wartime service of Japanese Americans.
[431]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00431&search_id=134339
The
exhibition
claimed a total of 18,143 individual decorations. [431; 32]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00431&search_id=134339&pagenum=032
The
official
records of the 442 Regimental Combat Team show that as of April 30,
1946 only 3,909 “awards had been presented to members of the
regiment.”
[431;
34]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00431&search_id=134339&pagenum=34
The
Regimental
History, AMERICANS, The Story
of The 442d Combat Team [431; 37]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00431&search_id=134339&pagenum=37
Lists
3,915
individual awards.
Just
where
did the Smithsonian Museum of American History get its numbers and why
didn’t it consult reliable sources before presenting its outrageous
claims to the American People?
Other
fabricated
claims included the awarding 9,486 Purple Hearts [PH],
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/smithsonian/smithsonian13.php
and
560
Silver Stars. [SS]
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/smithsonian/smithsonian16.php
The
official
record shows approximately 3,600 Purple Hearts (read explanation under
numbers) and 343 Silver Stars. Many of the Silver Stars were awarded
to non-Japanese officers in the unit. [Official Record]
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/smithsonian/smithsonian14.php
The
claim
that the unit took a 300 percent casualty rate was based on the
fabricated claim of having been awarded 9,486 Purple Hearts.
Numbers
of
casualties were also distorted in other instances for effect. During
the action of the “lost” battalion the exhibition, supposedly quoting
the U.S. Congressional Record, claimed 814 casualties for the five-day
action. [Casualties]
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/smithsonian/smithsonian17.php
The
official
regimental report for the month of October, 1944, the month in which
the “lost” battalion action was fought, lists in its “Exhibit ‘A’” the
total casualties for the month as being 814. The 442nd was engaged in
combat operations for 16 days. 814 represent total casualties for
those days, not for the five involving the “lost” battalion. [October
’44 Report]
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/smithsonian/smithsonian18.php
Some
Japanese
Americans have even claimed that the 442nd lost 814 killed in action
to save a couple hundred white soldiers.
Japanese
Americans
provided valuable service working as translators at intelligence
centers and with army combat units. However, that was not good enough.
The Smithsonian declaration claiming to quote “General MacArthur’s
intelligence chief” credited Japanese Americans so serving as having
“shortened the war by two years and averting one million U.S.
casualties.” [Appendix 14]
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/smithsonian/smithsonian19.php
This
claim
is so preposterous! It boggles the mind, but as the saying goes, “the
ignorant man must believe everything he is told.” And, if you can’t
trust the Smithsonian Museum of American History, who can you trust?
Major
General
Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s intelligence chief, never said what
he is claimed to have said, and even if he had it would still be
outrageously incorrect. The achievements he supposedly attributed to
Japanese Americans were, in fact, those rightly attributed to code
breakers in all services and those working in signals intelligence
during the war. Japanese Americans were not, except for rare
exceptions relating to difficult translation issues, ever involved in
this activity, although it has also been falsely claimed they were.
The
National
Park Service at the Presidio of San Francisco still (2015) proffers
the Willoughby claim substituting “countless lives” for a “million
lives” but including the shortening of the war by two years. This is
just a small part of the rest of the false history they push.
[Patriotism and Prejudice]
http://www.nps.gov/goga/planyourvisit/upload/MIS-bulletin_6-07_medium.pdf
Why
The Exaggerated and False Claims?
The
object
of making false claims of accomplishments, clearly, was not only to
wildly exaggerate the service of Japanese Americans but, also, to
instill guilt in Americans for the unjust and terrible treatment given
to their people in the U.S. while they were providing such selfless
and dramatic service overseas.
In
this
regard Senator Daniel Inouye, credited by some as the architect of the
Commission/Redress movement, seldom missed a chance to play the guilt
game. One example was during the confirmation hearing for General Eric
Shinseki to the office of Chief of Staff of the Army.
Inouye
introduced
Shinseki as having been classified at birth in Hawaii as an enemy
alien by the Selective Service because Japanese Americans after the
war started were classified 4C, which Inouye said was designated
“enemy alien.” He then made the point that the country has come a long
way since then in overcoming its racism: A Japanese American born an
enemy alien was now selected to be Chief of Staff of the Army.
Inouye’s story grew instant legs and was repeated all over the
country. It was pure fiction.
The
Selective
Service does not classify people as enemy aliens. The President does
and did. The reader will recall that only Japanese citizens above the
age of 14 were so classified.
U.S.
citizens
were never enemy aliens.
The
4C
Selective Service classification during WW II was for “Alien not
acceptable to armed forces and certain neutral aliens.” [438; 4]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=438&pagenum=4
Recall
that
Magic intercepts revealed unknown Japanese Americans in the U. S Army
were spying for Japan and the ONI reported that 52% of American born
Japanese held dual citizenship. [425; 20]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00425&search_id=&pagenum=020
The
Selective
Service classification 4C seems reasonable under the conditions that
prevailed at the time. Inouye’s story was pure racist emotional
manipulation.
Playing
the Race Card Both Ways
The
Japanese
race card played both ways. Not only could claims of exaggerated
service be justified based on the proclaimed racism against Japanese
during the war; “racist” treatment during the war could be used to
claim withholding of honors not recognized during the war. A case in
point was the awarding of 22 Medals of Honor, 55 years after the fact.
Public
Law
104 – 106, section 524, 1996, authorized a “Review regarding the
upgrading of Distinguished-Service (sic) Crosses and Navy Crosses
awarded to Asian-Americans and Native American Pacific Islanders for
World War II service.” [DSC]
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ106/html/PLAW-104publ106.htm
The
intent
of the review was clearly to determine if Medals of Honor had been
withheld for racial reasons. The
DSC
is the second highest award for valor; the Medal of Honor is the
highest. One such DSC award was of particular interest, I am sure,
that of Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii.
The
review
was conducted during 1996 and 1998. James McNaughton, the Command
Historian of the Defense Language Institute, headed the effort.
The
review
identified 104 soldiers who were Asian Americans and who received the
DSC. Among those were 47 Japanese Americans and 54 Filipinos “who were
nationals of the United States at the time.”
The
review
board reported:
We found no evidence of
discrimination against Asian Americans. We found no evidence that
award recommendations were rejected or downgraded on the basis of
race. Even in segregated units such as the 100th Battalion and 442nd
Regimental Combat Team (RCT), white officers made sure that their
Japanese American soldiers received full recognition for valor.
[432; 4-5]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00432&search_id=132657&pagenum=4
Nonetheless,
and
not too surprisingly, the review board’s findings were ignored by the
Secretary of the Army and a Senior Army Decorations Board, for
political reasons, and 21 Medals of Honor were awarded, fifty-five
years after the fact, to Japanese Americans. None were awarded to the
54 Filipinos. Senator Inouye got his medal and the reputation of the
Japanese Americans in WW II got further burnished at the expense of
those who earned their coveted honors according to the time-honored
rules regarding this highest award, not to political expediency.
Later,
in
another ploy, Senator Akaka, of Hawaii, secured the upgrade of another
Japanese American’s Silver Star medal (third highest) to a Medal of
Honor. This was done be claiming that at the time of the initial award
the Medal of Honor was not authorized because the recipient was a
medic. [434]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00434&search_id=132661
Any
excuse
in a pinch. Medics, as
anyone who knows anything about Medals of Honor knows, were among the
most frequent recipients of that highest of decorations.
For
a
comprehensive discussion of the Medal of Honor caper see “Japanese
Americans Get Affirmative Action Medals of Honor,” by Commander
William J. Hopwood, USNR (Ret.). [Special Report]
http://internmentarchives.com/specialreports/medalofhonor/medalofhonor1.php
Congressional
Gold Medal
And
the
beat goes on. In 2012 when the 442 RCT and its members were honored
with the presentation of the Congressional Gold Medal in part for
their multiple awards of the Medal of Honor, the State of Utah honored
them with a concurrent resolution entitled “Utah’s Congressional Gold
Medal Day.”
[Special
Report]
http://www.internmentarchives.com/specialreports/hcr5.pdf
As
the
reader can see from the annotations to the resolution it is a work of
melodramatic fiction, pitting guilt-inspiring charges such as
“infamous concentration camps,” against fabricated claims of
accomplishments and superiority. It is but another in a long line of
“official” documents that will be quoted over and over again as
authoritative proof of Japanese Americans many deeds of fictional
heroics despite the “terrible racism, undeserved and unjustified
hardships” visited on them during the war.
THE
DECISION
TO EVACUATE
The
decision
to evacuate all Japanese from the West Coast was made for national
security reasons and was not made lightly. It was made at the highest
level of command, the President, and was made after long and complex
estimates of the situation. It was not made by a subordinate general
with a racial axe to grind as long claimed by those who see the world
through racial lenses.
Focusing
on
the “racist” commander of the Western Defense Command, Lt. Gen.
DeWitt, allowed the Commission to deflect responsibility for the
“heinous” act onto an unsympathetic character, just like in the
movies. But, as we have earlier revealed DeWitt opposed evacuation of
Japanese American citizens until after the President decided on it. He
then followed orders. In his final recommendations he merely proposed
what had already been decided.
Recall
that
prior to those final recommendations, “If all of General DeWitt’s
recommendations … had been accepted, it would have made necessary the
evacuation of nearly 89,000 enemy aliens … only 25,000 of whom would
have been Japanese,” and none of them U.S. citizens. [109; 17]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=109&pagenum=17
Commission
Manipulation
It
was
clever of the Commission to take advantage of the post-Vietnam
insecurity of the nation at a time when racial tensions were high, to
claim that the evacuation of Japanese was largely caused by racism,
war hysteria and lack of political will. At one swipe, it condemned
the entire nation and its leaders for despicable and wrong-thinking
motives. All without having to dig into the objective and real-life
reasons for the evacuation revealed in Japanese wartime plans,
capabilities, intentions and actions.
Where
the Blame Truly Lies
Imperial
Japan
Blame
for
the evacuation, it seems to me, is most justly placed first on
Imperial Japan. That country made the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor,
destroyed much of our fleet and left the West Coast vulnerable to
attack. Further, its reign of terror in China including the Rape of
Nanking was well known in the United States and had its effect on the
population’s concerns. The Commission called this war hysteria, but
reasonable people would say it was realistic and justified concern.
Imperial
Japan’s
extensive use of expatriate Japanese in support of its many conquests
was also known, as was their brutal treatment of American and Filipino
POW’s in the Philippines.
Recall
that
in their Magic message establishing their intelligence operations for
possible war they urged “utmost caution” in “Utilization of our
“Second Generations” and “our resident nationals.” Nevertheless these people who are referred to as “our people”
in the message were used extensively in intelligence gathering. The
results were predictable.
Those
Japanese Who Posed a Threat to the Country
Next
in
culpability for the evacuation were those Japanese and Japanese
Americans who were either involved in gathering intelligence
information for Japan, were associated with organizations engaged or
pledged to engage in that activity or worse and, finally, those who by
their education and attitude placed their loyalty to the U.S. in
question. Recall there were an estimated 10,000 of these according to
Lt. Cmdr. Ringle and Edward Ennis.
Those
Japanese Who Did Nothing
One
final
group of Japanese bears some responsibility: those who were aware of
activity inimical to the U.S. by their fellow Japanese and who failed
to report it. Much has been made about how Japanese loyal to the U.S.
assisted authorities in identifying individuals acting against U.S.
interests. But examples are few. Consider the experience of the FBI in
San Francisco after Pearl Harbor.
This office has since the declaration
of war attempted to develop confidential informants among the Japanese
colony in San Francisco … by contacting all professional Japanese such
as doctors, dentists, lawyer, barbers, beauty salon operators, pool
halls et cetera. … The results of these contacts have been nil almost
without exception. Out of approximately fifty contacts, only four or
five appeared to be cooperative enough to consider as possible
informants. None of these individuals has yet to furnish any
information of value. [94; 6]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=94&pagenum=6
Does
“When
Japan calls, you must know that it is Japanese blood that flows in
your veins” sound familiar and come to mind?
U.S.
Responsibility
The
United
States, of course, also bears some responsibility for the evacuation
from the West Coast.
Faced with a seemingly implacable enemy
who had attacked without warning, destroyed most of our Pacific Fleet
and threatened our homeland.
Faced with an enemy who had used its
expatriates in the conquest of numerous nations and considered them
“our people.” Who had been engaged in intelligence collection in the
U.S. for years [PJD 59] and
was organizing for wartime collection of intelligence, using its
people in the U.S.
Faced with a conservative estimate of
10,000 disloyals among the Japanese
population.
The
President
ordered the evacuation of the West Coast. It achieved its purpose:
there was no subversive activity of any kind by people of Japanese
ancestry on the West Coast reported after the evacuation. That was
because there were no Japanese on the West Coast after the evacuation:
A pretty simple cause and effect.
Disloyalty
After the Evacuation
The
same
lack of subversive activity cannot be said for conditions in
relocation centers where:
3,938 military-age male, U.S. citizens
refused to unqualifiedly renounce their loyalty to Japan and swear
allegiance to the U.S. [2; 180]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=2&pagenum=180
Thousands petitioned the U.S.
government to be allowed to return and fight for Japan. [428; 3-7]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00428&search_id=&pagenum=3
[171]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=171&pagenum=
Some 20,000 registered to be sent to
Japan during the war, because of loyalty to that country, to avoid the
draft and possible combat in support of the U.S. or as the Commission
would have us believe, because their feeling were hurt. It should be
noted that after the defeat of Japan only 4,724 opted to returned to
that country. [2; 23]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00002&search_id=&pagenum=23
Thousands actively participated in
military style drills and ceremonies honoring Japan and its emperor
and forced loyal American citizens to join them in these treasonous
demonstrations.[315]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00315&search_id=136023
5,589 of these “sensitive” individuals,
many of whom expressed a desire to join the Imperial Japanese forces
that were known for brutality, sadism, cruelty and racist mentality,
hardly a place for “sensitive” potential soldiers of Nippon, not only
renounced their U.S. citizenship but forced loyal Japanese Americans
to do the same. [2; 192]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00002&search_id=&pagenum=192
It
is
true that many and perhaps most of the numbers cited above often
include the same individuals. But it is also true that there were a
very large number involved in any one of the disloyal actions.
The
political
and propaganda efforts to bring obloquy upon the United States, its
people and its wartime leaders for acts taken to secure the country
during the early stages of a difficult war is shameful.
Shameful to those Japanese Americans,
who lie, manipulate, ignore or conceal the truth of the matter while
basking in the achievements, real and contrived, of their fellow
Japanese.
Shameful to those who used and continue
to use their government sponsored appointments and grants to maintain
the general ignorance of threats from elements of the Japanese
population on the West Coast at the start of WW II.
Shameful to those claiming to be
academics seeking and teaching the truth and to those who write
history but who use their positions to mislead, keep ignorant and
perpetuate the myth of racist guilt.
Shameful, finally, to the politicians
who in their ignorance, often seeking to curry favor with a “victim”
class, have aided and abetted the fabrication of a distorted history
of our country and funded the propagation of it.
Shameful to the courts and judges who,
because of their own racist bias, have used their position and
authority to make decisions based on incomplete or fabricated facts
accepted at face value, awarded judgments, nullified decisions and
given legal cover to historical lies.
Senator
S.
I Hayakawa testified before the U.S. Senate:
Mr. President, I am proud to be a
Japanese-American. But when a small but vocal group of
Japanese-Americans calling themselves a redress committee demand a
cash indemnity of $25,000 …my flesh crawls with shame and
embarrassment.
[206; 8]
http://internmentarchives.com/showdoc.php?docid=00206&search_id=&pagenum=008
There
is
enough shame to go around.
PERSPECTIVE
ON
THE EVACUATION
During
and
after WW II the world was in turmoil. During the war some fifty
million people died. Most were not engaged in combat but were victims
of the fighting or were killed by ruthless regimes, among them racist,
Imperial Japan. An estimated quarter million Chinese, for example,
were murdered by the Japanese during their hunt for Doolittle Raiders
who had bombed Japan and then ditched their planes in China.
Millions
of
others around the world were “exterminated.” Tens of millions suffered
for years after the war, many more died. Countless lives were
shattered, families destroyed and lifelong agony and sorrow endured by
people who had no control over events in their lives.
In
the
United States almost a half million servicemen gave their lives in the
fight. Almost twice that number were wounded, many suffered physically
and mentally for the rest of their lives. Millions of family members
suffered the rest of their lives over these sacrifices.
In
a
world in which countless millions suffered and scores of millions died
a small group of Japanese and Japanese Americans were evacuated from
their homes on the West Coast of the United States and moved inland.
This was done for the security of the nation. They were housed, fed,
cared for, schooled, given jobs, paid, relocated and protected. Under
the conditions of the time, they were pretty well taken care of.
Their
situation
was not perfect and judged by the standards of today was somewhat
rough. But the conduct of thousands of these people before and after
their evacuation proved the move necessary.
That
thousands
were displaced and inconvenienced because of the actions of a minority
of the group was the price paid by all to remove the threat from the
West Coast. It was a small sacrifice compared to that made by scores
of millions of others in the country.
The
continual
whining, complaining and guilt mongering carried on by a relatively
few in our country today, aided and abetted by ignorant media and
misguided political forces, is disgraceful. And it dishonors those
Japanese who were involved and who recognized the reasons for, and
bore with grace the trials of, the event with forbearance and
fortitude.
To
them
we owe respect and thanks. To those who threatened the security of our
nation and brought about this unfortunate event and to those who
perpetuate a dishonest history of it, we owe nothing except our
contempt.
To
support
the enemy in time of war is treasonous. To deny you did so and blame
others for what then happened is cowardice, not to mention disloyal to
the country, which is to the point, isn’t it? To adopt as true a
history that ignores treason, cowardice and disloyalty is a national
disgrace.
[end]